BREAKING UP THE TREBLE PLAY: ATTACKS
ON THE PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE
ANTITRUST ACTION
Charles A. Sullivan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the Sherman Act' is nearly a century old, only recently
has a major controversy arisen over one of the more significant innovations of that statute: the creation of the private treble damage
action as a remedy for antitrust violations. Although the statutory
language, providing that any person "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall

recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee," has remained essentially unchanged since 1890,2 there are currently calls for more or less radical
revisions in the private remedy.
The criticism of the private treble damage approach to antitrust
enforcement began in the law reviews and has taken on a new significance in the wake of a legislative proposal by the Reagan Administration to restrict treble damage liability to certain kinds of antitrust
violations, remitting private plaintiffs to single damages, plus interest,
for other varieties of misconduct. 3 It is the purpose of this article to
explore the basic scholarly criticisms of the treble damages remedy as
they have emerged in the past few years and then to consider the
Administration's proposed legislative change, both on its own merits
and as an expression of some of the concerns which underlie the
scholarly criticisms. It is the thesis of this article that the treble dam* B.A., Siena College; LL.B., Harvard Law School: LL.M. .New York University; Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School.
The author wishes to thank: Neil B. Cohen, for his helpful review of earlier drafts: Dr.
Michael Risinger, who is largely responsible for footnote 61 but is not sure how well-baked the
rest of the article is; and Lorrie Van deCastle, who, in the nick of time, prevented my infliction
of numerous abuses on the English language.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
Section 7 of the original Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), which first
created the treble damages action has since been replaced by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
15 (1982). The Clayton Act, however, basically reenacted the damage provision of the Sherman
Act and extended the remedy to the new substantive violations the Clayton Act established.
I The President's Cabinet approved a package of proposed legislative reforms in the antitrust area on March 24, 1983. Reagan Administration Approves Proposalfor Antitrust, Intellectual PropertyBill, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) vol. 44, No. 1108 at 681, 713-14 (Mar. 31,
1983) [hereinafter cited as President's Proposal]; see infra notes 221-37 and accompanying text
for a full discussion of these proposals.
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ages remedy for private plaintiffs offers unique advantages in the
scheme of antitrust enforcement. 4 The criticisms of it are at best
overdrawn. Even more to the point, modification of the treble damage action threatens negative consequences for antitrust law.
In order to develop this thesis, the article will briefly trace the
history of the treble damage action in Part II. In Part III it will turn to
an analysis of the first of the two basic schools of criticism of treble
damage, considering the "efficiency" arguments against the remedy.
Part IV will treat the "unfairness" contentions as a reason to restrict
treble damages. In Part V, the article describes and analyzes the
Reagan Administration proposal in light of the treble damage controversy.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTION

The private damage action to enforce the antitrust laws 5 has had
an uneven history. Although conceived as a primary means of ensuring antitrust compliance, 6 this avenue soon fell into disuse and was
rarely traveled for a half-century after the enactment of the Sherman
Act 7 despite efforts to make it more appealing. s In view of the attrac-

I

At the present time, there are five basic modes of enforcing the antitrust laws. In addition
to the treble damage action, which is the subject of present concern, private persons may seek
equitable relief, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982); the Justice Department may either bring criminal
proceedings, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) and/or seek equitable relief, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982); and the
Federal Trade Commission may issue cease and desist orders. 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(b) (1982) and
45(b) (1982). As might be expected, each of these methods has its own advantages and disadvantages, and not every antitrust offense is subject to all five means of enforcement. See generally L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON ANTITRUST LAW §§ 240-253 (1977). While a detailed survey of these
enforcement approaches is beyond the scope of this article, some of the major limitations on
government enforcement are treated in Part III. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
As for private actions for injunctive relief see inJra note 32.
For purposes of § 4, the term "antitrust laws" basically embraces the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1982). The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-57
(1982), has been held not to create a private right of action for either single or treble damages.
E.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6 W. HAMILTON & 1. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 10, 82 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940);
H.B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 229, 603 (1954). But see K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 66-68 (1976); cf. United
States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954) (attorney general primarily charged with ensuring
antitrust compliance; private actions only supplement government enforcement of the antitrust
laws).
I This limited early use of the private remedy, although cited by many commentators, e.g.,

Note, Antitrust Enforcement by PrivateParties:Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage
Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952), is revealed most starkly by data collected in Posner, A Statistical

Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 371 (1970). Table 3 of the Posner article
reveals that an estimated 423 cases were brought from 1890 through 1939. Id. From 1940 to 1944
alone, however, 270 cases were commenced; and beginning in 1950, the figure for each five year
period was never less than 1,000, a number more than twice that for the entire first half-century
of the Sherman Act. Id.
8 In 1914, § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), was passed providing that
plaintiffs in private antitrust suits may use nonconsent "final judgments" obtained by the United
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tiveness of a route which may potentially yield damages three-fold
those suffered as well as costs and a reasonable attorneys' fee, 9 this
desuetude is startling. The explanation can hardly lie in the substantive doctrines of antitrust since the private remedy remained dormant
during periods of considerable governmental trustbusting activity.
Rather, the most probable reason was the widespread judicial hostility
to this congressional innovation,' ° a hostility manifested by courtcreated doctrines such as the in pari delicto defense" and the requirement of a "public injury" as part of the plaintiff's cause of action.12 In
addition, the courts in this early period tended to require a degree of
precision in proving the amount of damages which most plaintiffs
found difficult or impossible to meet, at least as to their broader
injuries.' 3 As a result, the success rate of plaintiffs, whether after

States in civil or criminal antitrust suits as 'prima facie evidence." The purpose of § 5(a) was
clearly to facilitate private actions. See, e.g., President Wilson's Special Message to Congress, 51
CONG. REC. 1962, 1964, January 20, 1914; see generally Timberlake, The Use of Government
Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36
N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1961).
At the time this provision was passed, the "mutuality" doctrine barred government suits
from having collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent private action against the same defendant.
See generally Sullivan, The Enforcement of Title VII: Meshing Public and Private Efforts, 71
Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 522-34 (1976). Although § 5(a) afforded a significant advantage to private
plaintiffs, the subsequent decline of the mutuality bar, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 320 (1979), rendered the prima facie evidence effect of less value. Since lack of mutuality no
longer necessarily precludes collateral estoppel, private plaintiffs will naturally seek to invoke the
conclusive bar of collateral estoppel by prior governmental suits rather than merely obtain the
prima facie evidence effect of § 5(a). An amendment to § 5 in 1980 ensures that collateral
estoppel is available in such situations except as to findings by the Federal Trade Commission.
Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1157 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982)).
9 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); see generally Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class
Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1656 (1972).
'0 The history of the treble damage remedy and of the award of an attorney's fee as a part of
recoverable costs is discussed in K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 63-77.
"f See generally Handler & Sacks, The Continued Vitality of In Pari Delicto as an Antitrust
Defense, 70 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1982); Lockhart, Violation of the Antitrust Laws as a Defense in
Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 507 (1947); Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defense in
Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965).
" See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at § 247: see generally Page, Antitrust Damages and
Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 467, 488 (1980).
13 See generally Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damage in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. REv. 363 (1954) (in antitrust cases courts have rejected standard of
"certainty" in calculating damages); Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Antitrust

Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 511 (1940); Greenwald, Capitalized Pricing of Injury to Capital in
Treble Damage Suits, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 84 (1959); Greenwald, Measurement of Damages in
Private Antitrust Suits, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 293 (1960); Guilfoil, Damage Determination in
PrivateAntitrust Suits, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 647 (1967); Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of
Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REV. 651 (1980); Lanzillotti, Problems of
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litigation or by way of settlement, was too low to encourage private
suits. 14

The growing interest in private damage actions after 1940 was in
part an outgrowth of the rebirth of interest in antitrust as an instrument of national economic policy by the public enforcement authorities,' 5 but it can perhaps be more appropriately attributed to a shift in
the Supreme Court's approach to antitrust law. 16 This occurred primarily through the Warren Court's development of a plaintiff-oriented jurisprudence.1 7 The groundwork for expansion was established
by earlier decisions liberalizing such aspects as the calculation of
damages 8 and expanding the "commerce" reach of federal law.' 9
Nevertheless, it was the Warren Court which undertook a major
broadening of substantive violations 20 and evinced a concomitant conProof of Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 329 (1971); Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 497 (1972); Weinberg, Recent
Trends in Antitrust Civil Action Damage Determinations, 1976 DUKE L.J. 485.
14 "Success" is a difficult concept to define or measure in this context. Thus, it has been stated
that plaintiffs prevailed in only 13 of 175 private actions pursued to final adjudication between
1890 and 1940. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959). Similarly, between 1952 and 1959, plaintiffs were successful in only
20 of 144 reported cases. Id. at 11. But Posner questions studies showing a low incidence of
private plaintiff "success" since they focus only on reported cases. Posner, supra note 7, at 382.
He notes that, since the vast majority of cases were dismissed by agreement of the parties, the
plaintiffs presumably obtained some satisfaction. Id. at 382-83. There has been little effort to
explore this aspect of private suits.
15 R. Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? in THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1965).
11 See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
17 See Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust
Strategy, 1978 DUE L.J. 1353, 1355.
1" For example, the Court authorized damage calculations which provided plaintiffs with
realistic chances of substantial recoveries. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946). Posner suggests that the Bigelow decision may have been an important factor in the
increase in private litigation. Posner, supra note 7, at 373-74.
11 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). The
Mandeville Farms Court viewed the inquiry whether a restraint occurs in interstate or intrastate
commerce as "merely a preliminary step" and found the "vital question [to be] whether the effect
[of a restraint on trade] is sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress' paramount policy
declared in the Act's terms to constitute a forbidden consequence." Id. at 234.
20 Perhaps the two most significant substantive decisions from the private plaintiff's perspective were United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (creating a rule of per se
illegality for certain vertical territorial restrictions) and Fortner Enters. v. United Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1968) (liberalizing the elements of proof for tying arrangements). In addition, the
Court's Robinson-Patman decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967), significantly eased the burdens of making out a primary line injury case. There were, of
course, other areas in which the Warren Court engaged in activist interpretation of the antitrust
law. For example, the Court demonstrated hostility toward corporate mergers, but this was not
a major source of private damage suits. E.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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21

cern with dismantling some of the doctrines which posed significant
barriers to private damage suits. Perhaps the three most notable steps
in this latter direction were the rejection of the pass-on defense, 2 1 the
narrowing of the in pari delicto concept,2 2 and the elimination of
''public injury" as a distinct requirement of proving a private antitrust
cause of action. 23 These liberalizations, coupled with an unprecedented resort to the class action device, 24 produced an avalanche of
25
private antitrust litigation.
21 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 382 U.S. 481 (1968). The pass-on defense
would have permitted a defendant to avoid liability to a particular plaintiff on the ground that
that plaintiff had not in fact suffered any harm because it had "passed-on" to a subsequent
purchaser any increase in costs stemming from the antitrust violation. Although the Hanover
Court rejected the defense, the decision may have proved a Pyrrhic victory for private lawsuits
since it left unresolved the question of the rights of other private plaintiffs, those to whom the
overcharges may have been passed on. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the
present Court answered this question by holding that a damage suit may not be brought by
"indirect purchasers." See infra notes 27 & 214 and accompanying text.
-1 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1967) ("nothing
in the language of the antitrust acts . . . indicates that Congress wanted to make the commonlaw in pari delicto doctrine a defense to treble-damage actions"); see supra note I1.
23 Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 357 U.S. 207 (1959); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) (per curiam); see L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 4, at § 247 (suggesting that rigorous standing doctrines have been developed to replace the
public injury limitation on private suits).
24 See, e.g., Duval, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago
Experience (I), 1976 AM.B.FoUND. RESEARCH J. 1023 [hereinafter cited as Duval (I)]; Duval,
The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (II), 1976
AM.B.FoUND. RESEARCH J. 1273 [hereinafter cited as Duval II]; see infra note 214 and accompanying text.
25 Posner's statistics reveal that 3,136 private suits were commenced between 1965 and 1969.
See Posner, supra note 7, at 371. This figure is all the more surprising in that, despite the huge
number of electrical equipment conspiracy cases, the figure is almost double that of the preceding period, 1960-1964. Id. Subsequent data reveal a continued high number of private actions.
The following table is drawn from M. -tANDLER, H. BLAKE, B. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 128-29 (2d ed. 1983) (citing 1982 ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 102):
1970
877
1971
1,445
1972
1,299
1973
1,152
1974
1,230
1975
1,375
1976
1,504
1977
1,611
1978
1,435
1979
1,234
1980
1,457
1981
1,292
In 1982, the number of private antitrust cases declined significantly to 1,037. 1982 ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. at 102, 105. The decrease in filings may well reflect some
of the recent Court decisions adversely affecting private suits.
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The advent of the Burger Court, however, has signaled a substantial shift in judicial receptivity to private suits. That Court's
26
changes in substantive antitrust doctrine are, of course, well-known.
Some procedural and remedial developments have also been adequately treated in the literature, especially the demolition of large
consumer class actions worked by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin27 and
the foreclosure of indirect purchasers from a damage action in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois (Illinois Brick) .28 A third potentially important
line of authority began with Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc. ,29 where the Court for the first time established a broad limitation on the kinds of injury for which antitrust plaintiffs could obtain a
damage recovery. 30 While the net effect of these Court decisions in
21

The three areas of greatest change have been: (1) the elimination of the per se rule as

applied to certain vertical territorial restraints, Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
443 U.S. 36 (1977); (2) expanding the requirements for proving a tying violation, United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 492 U.S. 610 (1977); and (3) a series of merger decisions
which, without fundamentally altering prior doctrine, have nevertheless created a far more
hospitable climate for business amalgamations by making proof of illegality more difficult, e.g.,
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The first two areas, those
reflecting the greatest doctrinal change, were the most fertile ground for private actions.
In addition, the present Court has taken an interest in the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 21(a) (1982)), passed by Congress in 1936.
Although that statute is frequently criticized as not a "true" antitrust law because of its perceived
effect of restricting competition, see generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT: POLICY AND LAW Vol. 1 (Monograph No. 4, 1980), it is technically an amendment of § 2 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), and therefore one of the antitrust laws for purposes of
the treble damage provision.
Over the past several years, the Court has tended first to narrow the substantive prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act to make private treble damage recovery more difficult even
when a violation exists. E.g., Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 1282
(1983) (meeting-competition defense may be invoked in an entire geographic area, not only on a
customer-by-customer basis); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981)
(holding that private plaintiff in secondary line case could not recover "'automatic damages,"
i.e., three times the amount of the price difference by which its competitor was favored; rather,
plaintiff must show actual injury resulting from the discrimination); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979) (buyer not generally liable for inducing price discrimination if seller's
discrimination is justified by meeting competition defense).
27 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (federal rules require individual notice to all class members who can
be reasonably identified and plaintiff must bear full costs of sending notice); see infra note 214
and accompanying text.
28 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
29 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
30 Essentially, the Brunswick Court articulated the concept of "antitrust injury" as a requirement for monetary recovery. Id. at 489. Put simply, it is not enough that a private plaintiff prove
causation in fact resulting from conduct which violates the antitrust laws. In addition, "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id.
(emphasis in original). "'Antitrust injury" is a kind of "standing" doctrine, but it is not clear
whether Brunswick will replace, or be superimposed on, the standing rules articulated by the
lower courts. See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework Jor Antitrust Stand-
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23

undermining private enforcement should not be underestimated, 3 ' the
focus of present concern is on the even broader attacks which threaten
the treble damage action.

32

Although the treble damage action has never been free of criticism, over the last ten years it has become the focus of two distinct
lines of attack. One approach, significant mainly because of the preeminence of its authors, is the concern of Professors Phillip Areeda and
Donald Turner who, in their multivolume work, Antitrust Law, 33
raise the potential unfairness of treble damage recovery to defendants. 34 Their proposed reform is that treble damages be made discre-

ing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977). The Supreme Court's encounters with antitrust standing after
Brunswick are scarcely definitive due in part to the case-by-case approach which it has adopted.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 908 (1983) ("the infinite variety of claims that may arise may [sic] it virtually impossible to
announce a black letter rule that will dictate the result in every case"); Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2548 (1982) (in determining question of standing, court must
analyze several factors including the causal connection between the alleged violation and the
harm to plaintiff and the nature of plaintiff's alleged injury); see Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 212, 214-15 (3d Cir. 1983); Brauman v.
Bassat Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
31 It is true that the Court has decided some cases in ways which facilitate private suits. Most
notable in this area are Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) and Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). The former decision recognized consumer standing to
bring treble damage actions while the latter permitted foreign governments to sue.
Despite these decisions the net effect of the Burger Court's jurisprudence has been restrictive
of the private right of action. The Pfizer decision is, obviously, not of great importance in terms
of the number of suits commenced. And Reiter, although potentially a very permissive decision,
will remain of limited significance in light of Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720; see supra note 21.
Read together, Reiter and Illinois Brick permit consumer suits only when the antitrust violators
sell directly to the consumers, a limitation which may immunize most antitrust violations from
consumer attack.
32 A private action for injunctive relief is an additional remedy which will often be available
to plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982); see generally Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under
State and FederalAntitrust Law, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 344; MacIntyre, Antitrust Injunctions: A
Flexible PrivateRemedy, 1966 DUKE L.J. 22. Further, this avenue of relief has recently become
more attractive because of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1396 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970)), which authorizes for the first time the award of
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who obtain an injunction.
Injunctive relief, however, has its own problems. These range from general questions of
"standing," to special problems such as the availability of dissolution in a private suit under § 7.
E.g., Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374, 399 n.178
(1976); see generally ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 1, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE
ANTITRUST SUIT: THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION VII OF THE CLAYTON ACT-POLICY AND

at 4-6, 59-61 (1977). Even though equitable relief may be available in a broader range of
situations than treble damages, e.g., Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,
596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979), it will remain a far less attractive remedy than a damage award in
most cases. Accordingly, the textual discussion is limited to the treble damage alternative.
2 P. Areeda & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
300-536 (1978).
Id. at 331(b).
LAW
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tionary with the courts rather than mandatory. 35 The current Reagan
Administration proposal, while considerably different from the
Areeda-Turner approach, is responsive to at least some of their concerns.

36

A second line of attack on the treble damage action emerges from
the economic analysis approach to antitrust which is associated with
the Chicago school, most notably with now-Judge Richard A.
Posner. 37 The basic predicate for this attack is that economic analysis
is not only appropriate in substantive antitrust rules of law but also
has significance in addressing procedural and remedial questions. The
basic work in this direction was done in a series of articles by Professors Elzinga and Breit, culminating in their book, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics (Antitrust Penalties),38 which
concluded that the treble damage action ought to be eliminated as
inefficient and be replaced by a fine-oriented system of public enforcement. 39 Although works by other scholars, most notably Professor Warren F. Schwartz, 40 have important implications for any economic analysis of the treble damage action, the Elzinga and Breit
approach deserves primary consideration in any reevaluation of this
enforcement device. 4' The economic approach is especially important
since it seems likely that the efficiency concerns they reflect underlie,
at least in part, the Reagan Administration proposal to limit the
42
applicability of treble damage recovery.
In sum, any comprehensive consideration of the private treble
damage antitrust action must come to grips both with issues of fairness

3 Id.
31 See infra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., R.A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
38 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6.
0 The authors devote an entire chapter to this theory. Id. at 112-38.
40 Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075
(1980); see infra notes 150-72 and accompanying text. Several articles printed in Georgetown
Law Journal respond to Professor Schwartz's work. Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust
Deference: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEo. L.J. 1131 (1980); Dorman,
The Case for Compensation: Why Compensatory Components are Required for Efficient Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1113 (1980); McChesney, On the Economics of Antitrust
Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1103 (1980); Reynolds, The Economics of Antitrust Enforcement:
Theory on Measurement, 68 Gro. L.J. 1121 (1980). This compilation represents the most
important work since Antitrust Penalties. Yet another important contribution to the economic
analysis of antitrust penalties is Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CI.
L. REV. 652 (1983), which was, however, published too recently to permit consideration in this
article.
41 A less radical suggestion of selective government preemption is explored in Wheeler,
Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1346-50 (1973).
12 See infra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
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to defendants and with issues of efficiency. The remainder of this
article will address these questions.
III.

"EFFICIENCY" AND TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS

A. The Elzinga and Breit Proposal
The basic thesis of Antitrust Penalties is that the present multipronged system of mixed public and private antitrust enforcement is
less "efficient" than the suggested alternative of a fine system enforced
solely by the government. 43 Analysis of this proposal depends first on
ascertaining the meaning of the term "efficient," the operative concept of the Elzinga-Breit proposal. It will then be possible to turn to
the three major sources of inefficiency which Elzinga and Breit perceive.
1. "Efficiency"
Efficiency is frequently used as a means-end or cost-benefit concept: the amount of input necessary to obtain a given output. This
notion, which might be called "productive efficiency," 44 is clearly not
what Professors Elzinga and Breit have in mind. They propose replacement of the treble damage remedy with a system of fines payable
to the government. 45 Whatever the problems of the treble damage
remedy, it is a more efficient device than the fine system if the goal is
to compensate injured partiesfor harm done to them. Since no compensation is envisioned under the proposed fine-only system, it is
necessarily a less efficient means of achieving this particular goal 46
(although the fines approach, to the extent that it is an effective
deterrent, would reduce the need for compensation). 41

43 See generally K. ELZINCA & W. BRIT, supra note 6, at 112-38.
44 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91, 104-06 (1978).
4- K. ELZINCA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 112-38.

11 If compensation is a separate goal of antitrust, which is the rule elsewhere in our legal
system, the means of balancing compensation with other factors, such as level of deterrence in
devising an efficient system of enforcement, are formidable. See Schwartz, supra note 40, at
1086-87, 1091. Schwartz also deals with problems of deciding who is to be compensated. These
are issues which antitrust law deals with under such rubrics as "standing," and "indirect
purchasers." Id. at 1091-1100.
'" To the extent that a fine system effectively deters violations, there will be fewer victims in
need of compensation. This does not alter the fact that no compensation would be paid to actual
victims. Since Antitrust Penalties envisions an optimal level of violations, see K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, supra note 6, at 83, it is clear that individuals would continue to be damaged, without
remedy, if the Elzinga and Breit approach were adopted.
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The concept of efficiency which Antitrust Penaltiesemploys is, of
course, the economist's notion of "allocative efficiency." Although this
concept can be defined in a number of ways, 48 it generally embraces
the allocation of societal resources to produce outputs which will
maximize the welfare of individuals. For present purposes this article
deals with Elzinga and Breit's concern with efficiency in the sense of
enforcing the antitrust laws to the point where the courts' marginal
costs of enforcement equal the marginal benefits of increased competition. 49 While efficiency is familiar territory to scholars dealing with
substantive violations, Antitrust Penaltiesattempts to break ground by
applying economic analysis to the remedial scheme.5 0 The overarching
principle is that "[p]ublic policy should attempt to balance the loss in
the value of production against the gain in the value of production
resulting from the policy." 5' The application of this principle is made
plain by a revealing footnote in the Elzinga-Breit work. Of Golda
Meir, who is said to have taught a lesson to the Israeli Knesset, they
write:
In the face of a rising rate of rapes, the politicians proposed a bill to
protect the nation's women by placing them under curfew. Mrs.
Meir pointed out that such a law would be punishing the victim,
not the criminal, and suggested the curfew be placed on men. Both
missed [the] point.... [I]f a curfew is to be imposed, it should be
placed on that group whose loss would cause the least sacrifice of
52
total output.
Antitrust Penalties, then, subordinates notions of "fairness" or
"justice" to the concept of increased output. Indeed, the conflict
between "efficiency" and "justice" can be sharpened even more by
slightly altering the example. Elzinga and Breit suggest dividing society into two classes-men (potential rapists) and women (potential
victims)-and choosing a remedy (a curfew for one group) on the

41 See generally Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 221 (1980); Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice
and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
41 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 9-12.
s5 Allocative efficiency is not unrelated to productive efficiency since competition should
impel producers to minimize costs, but the concepts are distinguishable. Consider the slide-rule
business after the advent of electronic calculators: the decline in demand for slide-rules and
consequent fall in price might well force each producer towards the highest production efficiency
to maximize profits or minimize losses. Nevertheless, the use of that industry's resources might
well be more valuable in making calculators than in continuing production of slide-rules. And
this could be true even if the resources were used inefficiently (production-wise) to make
calculators.
11 Id. at 83.
52 Id. at 83 n.6 (emphasis added).
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basis of how "total output" would be affected. But the basic analysisof Antitrust Penalties would not change even if the groups were
redefined: the decision whether actual rapists should suffer a penalty
(either being "curfewed" or sent to prison) or the group of potential
victims-all women-should be subjected to the curfew should be
made on the same grounds.5 3 Thus, in the name of increasing total
output, individual rapists might be freed while their potential victims
54
are immured!
This position is so absurd, even for an economist, that one must
ask whether there is some way to justify it. 55 The basis proffered by
Professors Elzinga and Breit is the "reciprocal nature of externalities,"
a concept drawn from the work of Ronald Coase. 56 It is not clear,
however, that Elzinga and Breit have correctly applied Coase's perception to the antitrust area. Coase's major contribution is his demonstration that, under certain assumptions, the placement of liability by
"fault" will not change the final outcome in terms of economic production. 57 Rather, it will merely shift payments between the parties
involved. This can be seen in the frictionless world of the economic
model where transaction costs are not present. In this world, Coase's
theory demonstrates that the efficiency aspects of liability-placement
are unimportant: those who are hurt would bribe those who are
benefitted in order to attain the economically efficient result.5 8 The
Coase theorem, therefore, might be stated as follows: in the absence of

One might go further-a curfew on either group should be rejected it the curlew with the
lesser impact on total output resulted in greater reduction than simply doing nothing about the
rape problem. Indeed, if output costs exceed output benefits for an), remedy, the Elzinga-Breit
analysis would indicate that rape should go unpunished.
Of course, as the class of law violators decreases in size vis-a-vis the class of victims, it is less
likely that total output would be more adversely affected by placing liability on the innocent
rather than the guilty. On the other hand, as the quantum of punishment of the guilty increases-prison terms mean costs of maintenance and loss of the rapists' productivity-output
losses rise. How these conflicting tendencies will balance out under an Antitrust Penalties
approach could only be decided on a case-by-case basis.
5 It also has the defect, at least in the United States, of being unconstitutional. Cf. Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) ("any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the
sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience" is unconstitutional) (emphasis in original).
"' Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). This article has produced a
substantial body of commentary applying, analyzing, and criticizing the work. E.g., Calabresi
& Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85
HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common
Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (1953); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979).
" See Coase, supra note 56, at 32-34.
"' The point is well illustrated in R.A. POSNER, supra note 37, at 51-52 which utilizes the
example of a railroad and adjacent farmland which Coase had used as one illustration of his
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transaction costs, economic efficiency will occur regardless of the
initial assignment of legal rights. 59 This is not to say, however, that
liability placement rules are unimportant. The imposition of liability
will obviously create income transfer effects, which not only have
60
moral and social implications but economic ramifications as well.
Regardless of the theoretical importance of the Coase theorem,"
Coase himself recognized that analysis became considerably more

analysis, Coase, supra note 56, at 32-34. If liability is placed on the railroad for sparks emission
which damages nearby crops, the land use results will not differ from those which would occur if
the railroad were immunized. R.A. POSNEU, supra note 37, at 52. If a railroad is the more
valuable use, the railroad will purchase the adjacent land from the farmers when liability is
imposed on the railroad; the land will then lie fallow (or be transferred to a use with which
sparks would not interfere). Id. This is, land-use-wise, the same result which would follow if
liability were put on the farmers; they would then be compelled to let the land lie fallow (or
transfer it to a nonconflicting use). Id.
19 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 56, at 1094-95.
60 In the railroad hypothetical, supra note 58, for example, it is scarcely a matter of
indifference to the competing parties where liability is placed. And, even from a purely economic analysis, the struggle to avoid liability-whether by lawsuits, legislative lobbying, concealment of harms caused, etc.-may itself have significant costs. -Fault" may provide a
relatively simple and appealing means of solving these problems, at least compared to other
alternatives. See Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's
Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1671-75 (1974).
11 There is, of course, a certain "Wonderland" quality to the Coase Theorem, even in theory.
In the railroad example, supra note 58, Coase considered the respective rights of the railroad
owners and the owners of the adjacent land, arguing that the decision as to whether the railroad
would be liable for fires resulting from sparks emitted should depend on a comparison of "the
total social product yielded" by different rules of liability assignment. Coase, supra note 56, at
34.
Let us, however, take the example a little further. Suppose the railroad is not liable for
spark damage, and the farmers could, together, bribe the railroad into installing sparkcatchers
with no transaction costs. Coase posits crop damage to adjacent farmers from fires caused by
engine sparks at $60 a year. Presumably, the farmers would pay the railroad whatever sum
would still leave them a profit in the cultivated land. Precisely what sum is indeterminate would
result from the bargaining between the parties. Suppose the land profits were $20 per year and
the sparkeatcher installation cost five dollars for the same period. The sum paid by the farmers
would range between five dollars and $20. But what if one stick of dynamite, costing one dollar,
would destroy the tracks for a year. Obviously, it is economically rational for the farmers to
destroy the tracks, thereby saving themselves four dollars to $19.
What is wrong with this solution? The obvious answer-that it is illegal-is, of course,
wrong. For we are debating the very question of whether it should be illegal from an economic
perspective. If the farmers have no "right" not to have their crops burned, it is not clear why the
railroad should have a right not to have its tracks bombed.
Once one sees that "whether [bombing] is desirable or not depends on the particular
circumstances," id., the attractiveness of the Coase Theorem, even in theory, diminishes if only
because the complexities of its application increase. Coase built his Theorem on a foundation of
assumed legal rights, and applied it to fringe cases. In those instances, there is some appeal to
using Coase's approach. But when it is seen that every right is susceptible to the same analysis,
the possibility of working out Coase's analysis, even in the theoretic world of no transaction costs,
is not so clear. See generally Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
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complex in the real world: "Once the costs of carrying out market
transactions are taken into account it is clear that . . . a rearrangement of rights [through the market] will only be undertaken when the
increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it
about. '62
Further, some market transactions may be too costly to warrant
any reassignment of rights. "In such cases, the courts directly influence economic activity, 6 3 and therefore must take economic consequences into account. 64 Indeed, in any decision, the courts should try
"to reduce the need for [market] transactions, and thus reduce the
65
employment of resources in carrying them out.In short, in the real world Coase's Advice, as opposed to the
Coase Theorem, may be only that:
The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have
harmful effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for
them. What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing
the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere
66
as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm.
Although Elzinga and Breit purport to apply Coasian analysis to the
antitrust remedial scheme, they fail to do so in any meaningful way.
To begin, Antitrust Penalties explains:
If liability is imposed on the consumer, a monopolist causes damage to the consumer of his product in the form of consumer's
surplus lost. But if the liability is imposed on the monopolist
through some form of antitrust law, the customer of the monopolist, in insisting through the law that the monopolistic behavior
end, imposes a cost on the monopolist, the cost of lost monopoly
returns. The question of "'fault" is largely irrelevant in such a
setting. The real issue is: what party to the transactionis the most
efficient in preventing the misallocation resulting from monop67

oly?

Coase, supra note 56, at 15-16.
Id. at 19.
"4Although Coase favors courts taking economic consequences into account, he warned that

62
63

they should do so "insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the
legal position itself." Id. Apparently, he feared that uncertainty about rights would itself
adversely affect economic activity. To the extent that this perception is true, and it certainly
seems plausible, Coase's advice can only be applied on the frontiers of otherwise settled legal
rights. Perhaps that explains the problem of how far to take the Coase analysis discussed supra
note 61.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 27.
67 K. ELZINCA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 83 (emphasis added).
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This example totally misapplies Coase. The whole point of Coasian analysis is to increase output-that is, of course, the "social
product" which is the end of his analysis. 68 The one kind of action
which, by definition, cannot maximize social product is monopoly,6
simply because a rational monopolist, in order to raise the price, will
reduce its production. Further, where a true monopoly is concerned,
only the monopolist can avoid misallocation effects: the consumer,
again by definition, has no choice. At best, the consumer can reduce
the allocative inefficiencies by shifting to the best substitutes; however, if equally desirable substitutes (in price/quality terms) were
available, there would be no monopoly to begin with. 0
Economic analysis, therefore, makes the problem identified by
Elzinga and Breit a nonproblem and reinforces the noneconomic
approach. On the moral level, "fault" is irrelevant for Elzinga and
Breit only because the conduct in question is accorded equal value.
But the analysis is useful only if all conduct is morally neutral, and
neither Coase nor Antitrust Penalties resolves this question, they
merely posit it away. 7 1 If particular conduct-physical rape or monopolistic ripoff-is judged to lack any value, however, then there are
no "costs" involved in proscribing it, at least not costs that "count."
Despite this flaw, Elzinga and Breit do offer some more concrete
approaches to the economic analysis of treble damages in terms of
what has been called Coase's Advice. Working in the real world,
Antitrust Penalties states that, given transaction costs, "there is no
single policy or set of policies that would a priori lead to an efficient
output [and thus] [p]ublic policy should attempt to balance the loss in
the value of production against the gain in the value of production
resulting from the policy. '72 The authors then attempt to employ this
balancing process by identifying the sources of inefficiency (i.e.,
wasted resources) in the treble damage suit. 73 They conclude that a
11An example of proper use of Coase on externalities may be tobacco smoking. The act of
smoking imposes costs on nonsmokers, ranging from irritation (moral, mental or physical) to
serious health problems. On the other hand, to bar smoking imposes "withdrawal" costs on
smokers.
11 This is universally accepted as true except where the "second best" theory obtains. See
generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 24-29 (2d ed.
1980).
70 Monopoly can, of course, be defined economically only in terms of competing products. If
widgets are interchangeable with gizmos, the "monopolist" of widgets would have no power:
any attempt to raise the price of widgets would be met by a shift of demand to gizmos. An
economist, therefore, would not describe the sole producer of widgets as a monopolist.
7' Indeed, Coase stated his views "questions of equity apart." Coase, supra note 56, at 19.
7 K. ELZINCA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 83. The search for efficiency in the real world of
high transaction costs can be complex. See generally Polinsky, supra note 60, at 1671-74.
" K. ELZINCA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 84-96.
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fine-oriented government enforcement system is preferable.7 4 Any
analysis of this approach must consider both the asserted inefficiencies
of the compensation-oriented system and the relative inefficiencies of
the proposed alternative.
2. Inefficiencies of Treble Damage Suits
Much of Elzinga and Breit's case against treble damage suits rests
on the three sources of inefficiency which they identify: the "perverse
incentives effect"; the "misinformation effect"; and "reparations
costs." Upon analysis, none of these sources appears to pose an appreciable "real world" efficiency problem.
(a) Perverse Incentives
The "perverse incentives effect" refers to the possibility that "a
private party neglects to modify his behavior when the damage done
to him by the monopolistic firm exceeds the cost to him of avoiding
that damage or that the consumer modifies his behavior in order to
increase the damage done to him by the anticompetitive activity. ' 75
Elzinga and Breit claim that, in antitrust, this effect tends to be more
severe than in other areas of the law because the trebling feature of
antitrust recovery magnifies the potential profits of running up damages. 76 And the availability of attorneys' fees and costs to a successful
antitrust plaintiff means that any judgment is more likely to be "profitable" than in ordinary litigation where the costs of recovery must be
77
deducted from the award to determine net compensation.
These factors prove the existence of a perverse incentives tendency in antitrust. Assuming this is undesirable, 78 it remains to be seen
whether other antitrust principles operate to suppress that tendency.
Basically, Elzinga and Breit contend that the tendency is given full
play in antitrust because there is no doctrine of avoidable conse7,See id. at 112-38.
7 Id. at 84.
76 Id.
77 This is not to suggest that the attorneys' fees due from the plaintiff are limited to the
amount awarded as a reasonable attorneys' fee, or that in most antitrust cases the compensation
scheme is structured in that fashion. In fact, contingent fees seem common. See generally
Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L,
REv. 1656 (1972).
'8 To elaborate a point at supra note 30, it is not realistic to expect all injured parties to sue.
Any particular plaintiff who runs up her damages in order to escalate her treble damage award
will simply be increasing the deterrent effect of the statute. The defendant's total liability may
still be less than the total harm done by the defendant. In short, a perverse incentive viewed as to
an individual plaintiff may be justified as a means of adjusting the ratio of deterrence to harm.
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quences nor one of in pari delicto, and they cite some anecdotal
evidence to suggest that perverse incentives may exist in the economy.
On all counts, it appears they are wrong.
Consider first the doctrine of avoidable consequences or, as it is
sometimes known, mitigation of damages. As it operates in contract 9
and tort law, 80 the doctrine precludes a plaintiff from recovery for
damages which, though caused by defendant's wrong, could have
been avoided by reasonable efforts on the plaintiff's part.81 Obviously,
such a doctrine would be a strong counterbalance to any perverse
incentives tendency. Elzinga and Breit, however, apparently deny the
applicability of that doctrine in antitrust.8 2 As support for their position they cite one piece of gratuitous dictum in an obscure district
court opinion8 3 and then, citing no authority, claim that the view "has
prevailed." 84 This statement is flatly incorrect. Indeed, it is refuted by
two circuit court cases Elzinga and Breit themselves discuss, 85 and an
independent search for authority on the mitigation question leaves
88
little doubt that the courts will apply the doctrine to antitrust cases.
" E.g., 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 350 (1979).

§§

1039, 1043 (2d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS

11 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 919 (1977). Another common law doctrine,
"consent," is somewhat akin to mitigation but broader: it completely immunizes a defendant
from suit by any plaintiff who consented to the wrong. Id. at § 892. It seems doubtful whether
such a defense applies in antitrust, especially given the difficulties of determining what constitutes "consent." See generally Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in PrivateAntitrust
Suits, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1241 (1965).
" This "negative" rule is what is normally meant by the doctrine; there is, however, an
"affirmative" branch of it. A plaintiff may recover from the defendant for the costs of such
mitigation. See, e.g., Triebwasser & Katz v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356 (2d Cir. 1976).
12 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 84. Their position has been repeated by Professor
Schwartz without independent verification. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1086, 1092.
11 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 85 (citing State Wholesale Grocers v. GreatAtl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768, 777 (N.D. I11.1961)). The vitality of State Wholesale Grocers
is dubious in light of subsequent circuit court authority. A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 314
F.2d 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963), discussed injra note 86.
54 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 86.
85 See American Can Co. v. Russelville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951); Sun
Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
88 An independent examination of case authority reveals that the doctrine of mitigation had
been almost uniformly assumed or applied even prior to the publication of Antitrust Penalties,
and several cases since its publication have confirmed this principle. Perhaps the first case to
consider the issue was Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Ass'n, 106 F. 38 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900),
al-'d sub nom. W.W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 115 F. 27 (9th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 193 U.S. 38
(1904). In Lowry, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff could have avoided damages by
joining the defendant's association. 193 U.S. at 46. This argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court because it was not clear that the plaintiffs would have been admitted had they applied for
membership, and because the requirement of membership was an onerous condition that could
not be imposed. Id. at 47. The arguments were necessary, however, only if there is a duty to act
reasonably to mitigate damages as a condition for recovery. Otherwise, the discussion is entirely
irrelevant. Therefore, the Court in Lowry at least assumed the applicability of avoidable
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It would be a foolhardy plaintiff indeed who would run up her
damages in order to reap a trebled profit in her antitrust suit.
It should also be noted that, if Antitrust Penalties had been
correct as to the inapplicability of the avoidable consequences doctrine, the solution would be an extension of that rule to antitrust
cases. 87 In using this evidence of perverse incentives as a reason to
move to a fine-only enforcement system, the Elzinga and Breit work
uses a cannon to kill a flea. Perhaps recognizing this, later in their
book the authors note that even if the doctrine of avoidable consequences applied, "the perverse incentives effect would remain unless
compensation were not paid to those actually damaged." 88 This is
both unexplained and inexplicable, unless the authors are referring to
a second source of perverse incentive they identify: the absence of an
in pari delicto rule in antitrust.
They argue that, "[i]n antitrust the rule regarding the plaintiff's
behavior is precise: plaintiff's behavior is seldom, if ever, a bar to
collection. As a result, the perverse incentives effect is given full
sway."8' 9 If this were true, the indicated solution is, again, to restore
the doctrine, not to eliminate the private suit. But, once more, Antitrust Penalties mischaracterizes the law in its eagerness to reach the
economic argument.
consequences in an antitrust case. This is true despite the fact that the case is best viewed, in
modern terms, as establishing that participation in an illegal conspiracy is not a "reasonable"
mitigation.
Similarly, in A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 314 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 816 (1963), the court rejected a defense to a resale price maintenance claim that the
plaintiff-buyer should have mitigated damages by resuming purchases where the defendant
offered to do so. The court did not, however, reject the avoidable consequences doctrine; rather,
it accepted the doctrine, but found that the plaintiff need not have resumed purchases because
the offer to sell did not clearly renounce any efforts to control the buyer's resale price. Id. at 84142; accord Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
In Momand v. Universal Film Exchs., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 469, 477 (D. Mass. 1947), af'd, 172
F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949), the court was more direct, denying a
plaintiff's suit for losses of hundreds of thousands of dollars claimed to be incurred in order to
avoid losses of $10,000. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit invoked the doctrine before the publication
of Antitrust Penalties. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1077 (1972). Subsequently, several federal circuit courts have routinely applied the rule. Construction Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,521
(lth Cir. 1983); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980); Triebwasser &
Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356 (2d Cir. 1976).
8' An analogous provision was in fact written into Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) which limits employment discrimination recoveries. "Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated
against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Id.
"8 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 114-15.
89 Id. at 88-89 (footnotes omitted).
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To prove their point, Elzinga and Breit quote from Justice Black's
opinion in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. 0 :
"the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and
effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action."'"
But taken alone this statement is inherently ambiguous-does it extirpate in pari delicto root and branch or merely declare inapplicable the
common law tort notion in favor of a rule more adapted to antitrust
concerns? In context with the rest of Black's opinion, it seems likely
that he took the latter position since he reserved the question of
"whether such truly complete involvement and participation in a
monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea
of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action."'9 2 Further,
Black wrote only for a plurality of the Court, and five justices, concurring or dissenting, seemed to favor some sort of defense when
"truly complete involvement" of the plaintiff was shown. 93 This is, in
94
fact, how the lower courts have interpreted Perma Life.
Contrary to the argument raised in Antitrust Penalties, the state
of the law on the in pari delicto question is not "precise." While
Perma Life limited the broader reaches of the defense, it seems clear
that some constraints remain. Further, it is not clear that Elzinga and
Breit correctly approach the whole concept. They write that "[g]iven
this state of the law, many businessmen and consumers, cognizant of
the potential for collecting damages, can view the antitrust laws as a
type of insurance policy against 'poor purchasing' and will at the
margin reduce their precautionary purchasing efforts." 9

90

392 U.S. 134 (1968).

11 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 89 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Perma Life, 392
U.S. at 139-40).
92 392 U.S. at 140.
93 See, e.g., id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring) (plaintiff's right to enforce the antitrust laws
cannot be denied on the basis of the doctrine of in pari delicto, however, "[i]f the fault of the
parties is reasonably within the same scale-if the 'delictum' is approximately 'par'-then the
doctrine should bar recovery"); id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I cannot agree that . . . a
plaintiff who has actively sought to bring about illegal restraints on competition for his own
benefit [should] be permitted to demand redress"); see generally Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraintsof Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.
F. 621, 656-57.
94 E.g., THI Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1980);
Wilson P. Abraham Const. v. Texaco Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom.
Texaco Indus., Inc. v. Ratcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v.
Miller Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); see generally Note,
Plaintiff's Misconduct as a Defense in Private Antitrust Actions, 11 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 382
(1981).
11 K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 89.
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To begin with, it is hard to see what in pari delicto has to do with
consumer purchasing.96 Second, it would seem to have relatively little
to do even with business purchases. The core application of the doctrine would appear to be horizontal conspiracy-to preclude one
conspirator from suing another when their scheme backfires. While
such a view can be transferred to the vertical violation setting, the
typical vertical restraint does not involve "equal fault" at all, but is
rather a restraint imposed by the manufacturer upon its retailers.
Even before Perma Life, the cases refused to apply in pari delicto to
these situations on the view that manufacturer coercion negated the
fault element. 97 And, assuming there is truly equal fault in a vertical
situation (e.g., an exclusive dealing arrangement between a large
manufacturer and a large retailer), it is hard to see what damage
might flow from this.9"
In any event, the quotation is peculiarly revealing of the fundamental flaw with the "perverse incentives" problem, whether caused
by perceived inadequacies in the antitrust doctrines of mitigation of
damages or of in pari delicto. Professors Elzinga and Breit obviously
have in mind the "rational economic man" whose decisions, at least
"at the margin," are influenced by the law's perverse incentives. It
seems doubtful, however, whether any appreciable number of real
persons will increase their damages in order to profit by trebling
them. The risks of litigation are too severe to make this feasible.
Indeed, elsewhere in their book the authors point out that it is generally thought that businesspersons are risk-avoiders rather than riskpreferrers. 99 If this is true, potential plaintiffs are unlikely to incur
unnecessary damages in the hope of future treble recovery. The treble
damages, after all, must be discounted by the chances of not prevailing on the merits and of having an in pari delicto or mitigation defense
applied.

96 It may be possible to conceive of in pari delicto as a kind of "avoidable consequences" (or
vice versa), but that scarcely advances the antitrust analysis.
97 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Schubert, 268 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1945); see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1977); see generally Note, supra note 80.
11 Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 134, is itself an example of this point, The plaintiff franchisees
challenged certain restrictions on their ability to purchase and stock parts from anyone other
than the defendant franchisor. Id. at 137. Justice Black noted that such restraints were not in
their self-interest, and therefore could not reflect the free choice of plaintiffs. Id. at 139; see also
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at 347(c) (arguing that the damage measurement
may be reduced by plaintiff's illegality even if an absolute defense is not recognized).
" K. ELZINCA & W. BarT, supra note 6, at 116-20.
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While Antitrust Penaltiespays lip service to this reality, the basic
reliance on "perverse incentives" as a substantial reason for dismantling the private treble damage action reflects a judgment, however
unsupported, that the damage maximizer is an appreciable problem.
Indeed, the paucity of cases on point suggests the rarity of "perverse
incentives" leading to damage maximization. The antitrust defense
bar is rarely to be faulted for not actively pressing arguable legal
theories.
Perhaps sensing the unpersuasiveness of its case, Antitrust Penalties seeks to bolster its perverse incentives argument by evidence of this
inefficiency in operation. The best it can do in this regard is to argue
that "[i]n the case of the electrical equipment conspiracy, there was
evidence that the customers of this cartel were either aware (or had
strong suspicions) [sic] that they were purchasing under a regime of
rigged bidding." 100 From this Professors Elzinga and Breit apparently
infer that the failure to challenge such conduct prior to the government indictments was an instance of the perverse incentives effect in
operation: the victims were gleefully running up their damages in the
hopes of trebling them.
This scenario is far from convincing. Assuming that purchasers in
fact are "aware" of or "suspicious" about price fixing, there are more
plausible reasons for their failure to sue than the operation of perverse
incentives. First, suspicions are not a basis for an antitrust judgment,
and uncertainties of proof (especially without the leverage afforded
the government by its criminal law enforcement processes) may lead
potential plaintiffs to prudently forebear from suit until the conspiracy is uncovered by others.10 1
Second, the chief purchasers of electrical equipment are utilities
whose rates are regulated. This may have a dampening effect on such
customers' incentives to sue. Most obviously, the costs of supracompetitive prices for the price-fixed equipment can readily be passed

100Id. at 87.
101 See Hay, Book Review, 31 VAND. L. REV. 427, 433 (1978). This explanation is reinforced

by the fact that the electrical equipment cartel was a long-lived one, and, since the limitations
period must have run on nurerous causes of action, it is unlikely that "intentional damage
maximizing" was occurring. While the government's 1960 indictments reached back only to
1955, some private suits challenged conduct at least to 1948. C. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQuIPMENT CONSPIaACIES: TE TREBLE DAMAGE ACrIONS 2, 76-77 (1973). Until 1955, there was no
federal antitrust statute of limitation, leaving the federal courts to borrow state statutes. In 1955
Congress enacted a four-year statute of limitations applicable to any cause of action under 15
U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, Pub. L. No. 84-283, 69 Stat. 283. In 1976 the statute was amended to apply
to causes of action under § 15(c). Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1396 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15b (1982)).
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along to consumers: prior to the federal indictments, one could not
realistically expect public utilities commissions to look beyond the
bidding process to investigate this aspect of utility costs. And a treble
damage recovery might not swell real profits. Due to regulation of the
rate of return, any "profit" on such suits might simply mean a downward adjustment of rates in order to limit overall return. Indeed, it
has been argued that in regulated industries, purchasers may find
paying an inflated price more profitable than paying a lower price,
since the rate of return will be computed on the basis of invested
capital: thus, the larger the investment, the more profit yielded by
02
application of the basic rate of return.
In sum, Antitrust Penalties does not present a persuasive case for
an appreciable "perverse incentives" inefficiency as a result of treble
damage suits. In an attempt to justify their attack on the private
action, the authors identify other sources of inefficiency which are
equally unconvincing.
(b) The Misinformation Effect
Antitrust Penalties also looks to the "misinformation effect" as a
source of inefficiency and therefore a reason to eliminate the private
treble damage action. This effect is "the propensity for a private party
to claim that anticompetitive behavior has taken place when it has
not. "103 This claim is both familiar and difficult to assess. On the one
hand, the "misinformation effect" (usually referred to as "strike" or
"nuisance" suits by those not economically sophisticated) has been
frequently proclaimed as a reason for limiting antitrust procedural
and substantive doctrines. 104 It is scarcely surprising to find it pressed
into service in the cause of limiting antitrust enforcement.
On the other hand, the merits of the claim are hard to assess. It
ultimately rests on the assertion that appreciable numbers of meritless
cases are brought merely in order to obtain a settlement. But Professors Elzinga and Breit offer no evidence to support this assertion. In a
statement which is as far as they go in empirical proof, they write:
Nuisance suits are quite common in personal injury cases. And the
present structure of private treble damage suits, with their empha'o' See Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 914 n.118 (1975).
103 K, ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 90.
'04 E.g., Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust SuitsThe Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1971); see Note, Antitrust
Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE
L.J. 1010, 1062 (1952).
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sis on strict liability, offers even greater incentives for suits of this
nature. Given the attitudes of the managers of large corporations
towards risk, lawyers and their clients may see businessmen as
1 5
tantalizingly vulnerable.
Analysis of the "misinformation effect" must focus on the empirical question. Obviously, as long as it remains unresolved no definitive
judgment as to the "inefficiency" of the treble damage enforcement
action is possible. Ultimately, Elzinga and Breit's position rests on an
intuitive perception of a significant problem, perhaps bulwarked by
anecdotal evidence of the "strike suits I have known" variety, and
impelled by the fact that, under their economic model, the misinformation effect should be a real problem.
That, however, is not enough. Both in law and in the more
mundane concerns, the force of inertia typically leads us to put the
burden of persuasion on those who wish to change the status quo.
Antitrust Penalties completely fails to carry that burden. It offers no
empirical evidence that the problem it discerns is a serious one, and
there is something of the surreal about the image of corporate America
as "tantalizingly vulnerable," bringing to mind hulking Goliaths quivering in their sandals as predatory Davids roam unrestrained. Less
picturesquely, the very absence of data on the misinformation effect
casts serious doubt upon the significance of the problem. Admittedly,
taking a census of strike suits would pose severe data collection problems. 06 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that studies of the question would
10 7
be totally absent if it were a serious problem.
Further, one must not underestimate the significance of the
Elzinga and Breit "misinformation effect." That effect exists in every
case in which the law awards compensation to an injured party,
whether the cause of action be contract, tort, property, or state or
other federal statutory schemes. While the seriousness of the problem
may vary depending on many factors, including the opportunity for
fraud-in-fact allegations, the problem is an inevitable concomitant of

105 K. ELZINrA

& W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
Since fraud will not be confessed by the perpetrators, no definitive quantification of the
problem would be possible no matter how obvious it might be. It would, however, be feasible to
undertake random case studies by neutral parties who could make their evaluation of the nature
of the suit.
101Additional evidence suggesting that fraud is not a serious problem in antitrust cases lies in
the paucity of decisions on "bad faith" litigation. One major exception to the "American Rule"
that each party bears its own attorneys' fees is that a prevailing party can recover such fees from
an adversary who has brought or conducted the litigation in bad faith. Although there is some
question as to whether this doctrine is available to antitrust defendants, see infra note 113, the
very absence of cases litigating this issue is some evidence that the problem is not prevalent.
lo6
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any compensation system. In this light, it may be significant that the
"nuisance" suit has rarely been considered an important enough problem to warrant corrective action by way of eliminating the cause of
action in question. 0 8
Rather than meet the empirical challenge, Antitrust Penalties
tries to specify why nuisance suits are a priori likely to pose a significant problem in the antitrust area. Basically, the authors suggest this
results from a confluence of two reasons: (1) the unpredictable outcome of antitrust suits (due to uncertain substantive law, unclear
doctrines of plaintiff standing, and the lack of means to assess the
damages that might be awarded in a successful suit); and (2) the fact
that corporate management tends to be risk-averse. The authors also
note that, from a defendant's perspective, the uncertainties are
heightened by the possibility of jury trial: the jury may decide adversely to the "defendant company, usually a larger firm than the
plaintiff," on moral rather than legal grounds. 10 9 They summarize:
The upshot is that, however groundless a claim might be in reality,
every defendant must attach some positive probability to the prospect of losing if the claim is litigated. In such cases, a nuisance suit
can become a realistic threat if the defendant fails to settle on terms
agreed to by the plaintiff. In fact, the term nuisance suit may be
inappropriate. The amount of damages claimed, particularly under the umbrella of a class action, can be substantial. A rational
management, faced with the vagaries just mentioned, may settle
out of court-not so much to eliminate a nuisance-but as an in
terrorem response to the repercussions of an (even slim) chance of
losing. 1,0
There are several assumptions in this argument,"' but even conceding the basic predicates of uncertain outcome and risk-averse man10' Even in the personal injury area, frequently cited as a source of fraudulent claims, the
"misinformation effect" has not played an important part in the debate about no-fault. See
generally M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIvES

793-841 (2d ed. 1979).

Another area in which the alleged strike suit problem has provoked legal response is with
respect to the corporate derivative suit. But even under these circumstances, solution to the
perceived problem was "security for expenses" statutes, not elimination of the cause of action.
See generally Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 (1967).
'0
K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 93. Precisely the contrary effect of juries has been
suggested. Wheeler, supra note 41, at 1323 ("when the judge informs the jury that the actual
damages they fix will be trebled, the jury may reduce its estimate of actual damages").
""
K. ELZINA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
For example, even a risk-averse management may not be so cautious that it will pay any
significant amount to avoid the remote possibility that a suit judged to be "groundless" may be
won by the plaintiff. Similarly, the uncertainties are not undifferentiated and do not all cut
against the defendant. Unclear standing, for example, is more a deterrent to the plaintiffs suit,
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agement, it does not follow that such suits present a significant problem. There are, after all, countervailing factors. These include: (1) the
investment of plaintiff in terms of costs and attorneys' fees;11 2 (2) the
risk of plaintiff being assessed defendant's attorneys' fees if bad faith is
proven;1 3 (3) the likelihood that plaintiff's attorney will be subject to
disciplinary sanctions and assessment of defendant's costs for bringing
such an action; 1 4 (4) the possibility of plaintiff triggering a counterclaim; 1 5 (5) the specter that defendants, though normally risk-averse,
will react nonrationally to being "held-up" and refuse to settle; and
(6) the possibility that defendants will view litigating particular suits
as a necessary investment to prevent groundless suits from routinely
being brought.1 6 These factors will interact in unpredictable ways in
particular cases, making highly uncertain the extent to which a potential plaintiff will believe that it can recover by way of settlement of a
groundless suit.
Although the net result of these opposing tendencies cannot be
deduced a priori, the analysis does suggest that there is some reason to
doubt whether the theoretical tendency identified by Professors
Elzinga and Breit is an appreciable practical problem with treble
damage suits. Further, if nuisance suits are a real antitrust problem,
less radical solutions are available as alternatives to elimination of the
groundless or otherwise, in terms of liability. This is especially true since the more "groundless"
the suit the less likely is a "striking" plaintiff to pursue it in the face of a resolute defense.
II Even if the attorney is, in practical terms, the real party in interest in a nuisance suit, he or
she will have to incur the lost opportunity cost of the time spent litigating.
113 Unlike some other statutes which permit the award of attorneys' fees to the "prevailing
party," e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(k) (1976); see Christianburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Sherman Act provides for attorneys' fees only
to a successful plaintiff, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). But see 15 U.S.C. § 15 c(d)(2) (1982) (providing
for the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants in state parens patriae actions). As a
general rule, however, attorneys' fees may nevertheless be awarded to a prevailing defendant if
the action was commenced by the plaintiff in bad faith. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); see generally Comment, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith,
and Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 468 (1979). While this principle has been
rejected by one court of appeals for antitrust cases, Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1967), the reasoning is open to question. See Lawrence v.
Fuld, 32 F.R.D. 329 (D. Md. 1963) (defendant's argument for attorneys' fees "adequately
grounded in the law"). And although Byram was cited by the Supreme Court, the case was used
as support for an argument in favor of presumption of the bad faith rule by a federal statutory
scheme. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 413, 419 n.13 (1978).
"' See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see generally Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement:
Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
"~ See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
16 It is true that factors (5) and (6) are not costless for the defending business, and therefore
represent a disadvantage of the misinformation effect. But the existence of such behavior in
relatively few cases (with a concomitantly minimal social cost) may deter a large number of
groundless suits by raising the ante for items (1) and (2) and (3).
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private action. For example, costs and attorneys' fees could be
awarded to a successful defendant, either routinely or upon some
17
finding of "unreasonableness" or "bad faith" by the plaintiff.
(c) Reparations Costs
The third indictment of the treble damage action advanced in
8 Compared
Antitrust Penaltiesis the problem of "reparations costs." "l
to public enforcement, which normally does not involve reparations,
"[t]he compensation element of private enforcement further complicates and extends the usage of multidistrict litigation, out-of-court
negotiations, legal strategy, and all of the other trappings of reparations-induced private damage actions.""" One aspect of the general
problem is stressed: "[R]eal resources are utilized not only in the
conviction of violators but in the determination of damages. [This]
20
involves the use of scarce resources that could be put to better uses."
The general point seems to be that private litigation is more
costly than government litigation; the more specific point identifies
the cost of ascertaining the amount of damages as one important
reason for the alleged higher costs. The general point seems of doubtful importance apart from the latter. First, there is reason to doubt
that the statement is true, and no empirical evidence is adduced to
support it. There are certainly many examples to the contrary. 12'
Second, even if the typical government litigation is now more easily
resolved than private actions, the explanation almost certainly is that
there is usually less at stake than in private litigation. The predominate use of consent decrees,1 22 for example, could scarcely be expected
"I See supranote 95. Antitrust Penaltiesrecognizes this alternative, and even the possibility of
further penalties on plaintiffs, but dismisses them as "not persuasive." K. ELZINCA & W. BREIT,
supra note 6, at 115. The only reason offered is that it "might dampen the enthusiasm not only of
those with groundless claims but those with viable grievances as well." Id. This observation is
true, undoubtedly reflecting the rationale for the rule against attorneys' fees for the prevailing
defendant. But it is hardly an objection Elzinga and Breit have standing to make since their
government-fines proposal would not just dampen, but effectively douse, private plaintiffs'
enthusiasm by barring such suits entirely.
"I K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 95.
'IQ Id.
12o Id. at 96.
2 With respect to IBM, a number of private antitrust cases were brought and resolved,
whether by litigation or settlement, while the government's monopolization case dragged on. See
generally Sullivan, Monopolization: CorporateStrategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation
of the Law, 60 Tix. L. REv. 587 (1982).
12 See generally Sullivan, Enforcement of Government Antitrust Decrees by PrivateParties:
Third Party Beneficiary Rights and Intervenor Status, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 822 (1975); Zimmer &
Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment
Discrimination:Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DuKE L.J. 163.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:17

to continue if heavy penalties were typically demanded.1 23 Should
substantial penalties become typical of government suits, one can
confidently predict an increase in the complexity of public enforcement efforts. 124 Third, it is strange to have economists suggest that
monopoly enforcement is likely to be less costly than competitive
25
enforcement. 1
The more specific point-that eliminating the costs of identifying
damages would save the resources entailed in ascertaining damagesis undeniable. Further, this aspect of antitrust litigation is not insignificant. Nevertheless, the cost of computing reparations can be dismissed as wasteful only if compensation is not a proper purpose of
antitrust. This is not the case now and, taking a somewhat wider
perspective, it is scarcely conceivable outside the economist's model:
there is hardly an area of the law where private compensation has
been wholly subordinated to government enforcement. Even in the
situation often viewed as a governmental monopoly-the law of
crimes-there is almost always a tort counterpart available if the
126
wrongdoer's assets make the game worth the victim's candle.
Even within the economist's model, the costs of determining
compensation are not necessarily wasteful since they may be necessary
to efficiency. Absent compensation, persons who perceive themselves
as possible victims (which, given the broad scope of antitrust, is
everyone) may engage in protective behavior which is, in the aggregate, more costly than maintaining a reparations system.1 27 For exam-

123 Indeed, the ease with which the government now can obtain consent decrees may be
viewed as the result of a confluence of two factors. First, the decrees typically demand little of
the defendant beyond a promise not to violate the antitrust laws. See generally Zimmer &
Sullivan, supra note 122. Especially where the decree merely parrots basic antitrust prohibitions,
it costs the defendant little to enter into a decree restating that obligation. Second, the willingness of defendants to enter consent decrees is enhanced by the Clayton Act which provides that,
unlike litigated government judgments, consent decrees will have no prima facie evidence effect
in subsequent private suits. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982). In practical terms, the specter of treble
damage actions undoubtedly increases the effectiveness of Department enforcement.
124 It can scarcely be coincidental
that the most complex government litigations are the
monopolization suits where the defendant often has at stake its very existence as a unified
enterprise. The IBM litigation is again the best example. See generally Sullivan, supra note 121.
'25 Of course, to the extent that any plaintiff utilizes "free" court resources, there is less
tendency to cut costs than would otherwise be the case.
126 The main exception is "victimless crimes." Interestingly, however, there has traditionally
been widespread hostility to the criminalization of such conduct. It is also the area which has
traditionally presented the most difficulties with respect to corruption of governmental enforcement. See infra note 141.
121 See Landes & Posner,
The Private Enjorcement of Law, 4 J. LEcIs. STuDIEs 1, 34-35
(1975). The example given is that of railroad crossings. Id. If liability for negligence is not placed
on the railroad with compensation going to the victim, potential victims may take steps to
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pie, the costs of searching for products may increase if buyers have no
assurance of a right of action should they prove to have been victims
of a price-fixing conspiracy.
In short, the error of Antitrust Penalties is to ignore the benefit
which is purchased by the reparations cost-fairness. Like all other
scarce resources, fairness is not free, and the basic failure of the
Elzinga and Breit effort is its almost total omission of any treatment of
this aspect of the antitrust remedies problem. Perhaps to repair this
defect, Professor Breit delivered a paper devoting two paragraphs to
the question.1 2 He asserted that "[b]oth economic theory and the
actuality of the antitrust laws make the laudable goal of full restitution impossible," 129 and concluded that therefore no effort at compensation is warranted. 30 With whatever deference is due,13 ' this argument is less than compelling. One might as well conclude that since
the elimination of antitrust violations is impossible, the antitrust laws
ought to be repealed. 132 In both cases, the issue is whether the gain (be
it fairness or enhanced economic efficiency) is worth the cost. The
error of Antitrust Penaltiesis to exclude from the cost side of the ledger
"soft variables" such as fairness.
3. Inefficiencies of Monopoly Government Enforcement
Although there is substantial reason to doubt that the efficiency
costs of private enforcement are nearly as high as Antitrust Penalties
argues, an even more telling criticism of the book is the failure of
Professors Elzinga and Breit to adequately assess the costs of the
exclusive public enforcement mechanism they propose. Vesting exclu33
sive power in public authorities raises several problems.1

protect themselves-such as circuitous routes, building underpasses, etc.-which would require
more resources than the traditional compensation system. Id. at 35.
12S Breit, Efficiency and Equity Considerations, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 539, 548-49 (1976).
"I Id. at 548.
130 Id.
"I Breit properly disclaims any special expertise on equity. Id. at 539-40.
132 Breit would scarcely take this position. Indeed, in a panel discussion on his paper he states
that "nobody would argue, I hope, that all crime must be eliminated. There is an optimal
amount of crime. Everybody knows that." Panel Discussion, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 564, 575 (1976)
(statement of William Breit).
"I In addition to the problems discussed, there are also difficulties in setting the optimal fine
which are not adequately treated by Antitrust Penalties. E.g., Schaefer, supra note 102, at 90809 n.99 ("[a]lthough the fine justifiably might be excessive, it also might be too small because
corporate profits may not measure accurately the damages inflicted by an antitrust violator"),
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(a) The Possibility of Inadequate or Distorted Prosecution
An obvious advantage of a multipronged enforcement system is
that numerous enforcers will provide for more total enforcement, if
only because of different factual and legal perceptions, enforcement
strategies, or interests. 34 It is true that it may also increase the possibility of "overenforcement"-enforcement efforts which yield less
compliance than their prosecution costs.1 35 But there is no empirical
evidence to prove that overenforcement exists, and, even if there
were, a fines-only system could result in underenforcement13 for
several reasons.
First, if the general low regard of governmental efficiency is
justified, the governmental enforcers may be too inefficient for optimal enforcement. 37 There may also be bureaucratic tendencies systematically cutting against efficient enforcement.138 Second, the government enforcer may be mistaken in its enforcement philosophy or
strategies;139 these mistakes will become social costs without a backup
system to ensure optimal enforcement. 40 Third, the government en134 Indeed, Professor Posner suggests that the government enforcement agencies take into
account private incentives to sue in determining what kinds of cases to bring: they should
concentrate on situations where the victims do not have the ability and incentive to protect their
own interests. See Posner, supra note 7, at 419; Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 122, at 202-06.
135 See supra notes 44-74 and accompanying text.
1"6 There is no theoretical reason, from an economic efficiency standpoint, to believe that it is
better to have underenforcement rather than overenforcement if it is impossible to have "optimal" enforcement. But fairness would point towards overenforcement, and, practically speaking, an error on that side of optimal is likely to be less costly than an error on the other side:
overenforcement costs are transactions costs of litigation, and are likely to be a fraction of
underenforcement costs-permitting output reduction/price increases by antitrust violators.
"I There would obviously be no market incentives for a monopolist government enforcer to
keep costs down. To this extent, the use of resources to achieve a given result may be less efficient
than if enforcement were committed to a competitive private enforcement "industry" (which
may also provide a yardstick to permit evaluation of the efficiency of public efforts). Although
the provision for attorney fee awards to successful private plaintiffs may somewhat dull their
incentives for costcutting, this tendency should be largely offset by the incentive to minimize
costs in order to hedge against losing (in which case neither costs nor fees will be recovered) and
by the fact that only "reasonable" fees may be recovered even by a prevailing plaintiff. 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1982).
138 McChesney, supra note 40, at 1108-09 (government enforcers maximize their own selfinterest at expense of efficiency); Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1093 (conceding that a disadvantage of public enforcement is the absence of an incentive structure motivating public prosecutors); see Crumplar, An Alternative to Public and Victim Enforcement of the Federal Securities
and Antitrust Laws: Citizen Enforcement, 13 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 76 (1975); Posner, The Federal
Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969).
139 A recent example is the new Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,
493 (1982). The correctness of the approach they embody is a subject of considerable controversy. E.g., Cohen & Sullivan, The Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex and the New Antitrust Merger
Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration (unpublished manuscript).
140 Obviously, what is "correct" policy is controversial. A number of strategies for enforcement have been suggested by scholars. E.g., R. BoRK, supra note 44, at 415-16; Posner, A
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forcers may be subject to bribes, with the "dishonesty incentive" rising
as (i) the amount at stake increases and (ii) the absence of other
4
enforcers guarantees the bribe-giver immunity if it succeeds.1 1
Fourth, there is increased possibility of abuse of power by public
officials: the more power conferred, the greater the opportunities for
misuse. 42 Fifth, the effectiveness of the government enforcer will

Programfor the Antitrust Division, 38 U.

L. REV. 500 (1971); see generally S. WEAVE,
(1977).
Further, the controversial motive of some of the proposals underscores the problems of a
monopolist enforcer: adherence to wrong policies by the prosecutor will freeze federal antitrust
policies into that mold. A multipronged enforcement system, on the other hand, encourages
different views, leaving "errors" to be corrected in the litigative process where conflicting ideas
of correct policy can compete in an adversary context.
A current example is the policy of the Antitrust Division not to prosecute cases of vertical
price-fixing. The appropriateness of a refusal to enforce what is undoubtedly established law is
questionable, regardless of whether the enforcement agency views the law as correct policy.
Compare Litvack, Government Antitrust Policy: Theory Versus Practice and the Role of the
Antitrust Division, 60 TEX. L. REv. 649, 650 (1982) (Antitrust Division is precluded from
unilaterally ignoring established antitrust rules in favor of a purely economic approach to
antitrust enforcement) with Baxter, Separation of Power, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the
"Common Law"Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEx. L. REV. 661, 702 (1982) (Antitrust Division is
afforded broad discretion in enforcing the antitrust laws; it has a duty to prosecute on the basis of
conduct which has been found unlawful in the past only when such action will promote the
public interest). Even more questionable is the fact of announcement of a nonenforcement
policy. Such an announcement will encourage violations and can scarcely be justified on grounds
that other cases are more pressing in terms of enforcement resources. Uncertainty about government intentions would discourage violations. Nevertheless, the important point for present
purposes is not who is right or wrong on the merits of the vertical price-fixing debate, nor
whether the Antitrust Division's refusal to enforce now-settled law is correct. The point is that,
with government monopoly of enforcement, such a decision, unreviewed and, perhaps, unreviewable by either the judiciary or the Congress, would become determinative of national
policy. The existence of the private action, however, offers a fail-safe mechanism to ensure a
more thorough consideration of the issues by the judiciary.
"I See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEGIS. STUDIES 1 (1974). The existence and extent of possible venality in the federal Antitrust
Division and the Federal Trade Commission is, of course, undocumented. There have, however,
been occasional questions raised. See, e.g., Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust
Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555 (1973); Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department of
Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1973). The only response of
Antitrust Penaltiesto this possibility is the triumph of hope over experience: "[A] compensation
structure [for enforcers] that would eliminate malfeasance can be developed. The higher the
salary paid to enforcers, the greater is the cost to them of violations of trust. An alternative would
be to increase the penalties for dishonesty." K. ELZINGA & W. BRIEIT, supra note 6, at 116 (citing
Becker & Stigler, supra). Despite the supporting citation, it seems unlikely that economists will
develop a solution to a problem that has eluded rulers for centuries. In any event, Becker and
Stigler recognize that rewarding victim enforcement is an alternative method of dealing with
bribery: "Private triple damage suits have become the only effective sanction of the antitrust
laws." Becker & Stigler, supra, at 13. Indeed, they basically advocate a shift to private enforcement. See id. 13-14; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 127.
"I Crumplar, supra note 138, at 97-98.
CHI.
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depend entirely on the level of resources allotted it by Congress, and
there is reason to doubt that such allocations will be apportioned
according to any real cost-benefit analysis. 4 3 Sixth, regardless of the
actual operations of the government enforcer, the perceptions of potential law violators may be influenced in favor of illegality by making
the government a monopoly enforcer. Despite the considerable remedies available to the government in the past, many attribute the real
44
deterrence of the antitrust laws to fears of private suit. 1
(b) The Possibility of Court or Jury Unwillingness
to Convict if a Large Fine is at Issue
As is well known in the field of criminal law, increasing the
potential penalty does not necessarily result in more enforcement: the
very size of the sanction may lend itself to less prosecution or more
jury (or judge) nullification. 4 5 While a similar objection could
be made to the treble damage award, here there is a conflicting
consideration. Although it has occasionally been argued that the mandatory trebling feature actually has been counterproductive for plaintiffs insofar as it has led to the judicial development of restrictive
doctrines such as standing and to adverse jury verdicts, 14 6 the very
existence of a damaged plaintiff may counterbalance the harshness of
a pure fine rule. Instead of the money going to a faceless government,
it will redound to the benefit of an actual victim, a result which may
temper some of the less rational nullification that might otherwise be
47
feared. 1
4. Summary
Obviously, these logical possibilities do not demonstrate that the
present multipronged enforcement scheme is optimal. They do, how" Id. at 98-99; see Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict

of Interest, 4 J. LEGIS. STUDIES 47, 67-68 (1975).
144See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 30, at 848-49; Note, supra note 7, at 1058-61.
'41 See Panel Discussion, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 564, 573-74 (statement of Mr. Blecher): Wheeler,
supra note 41, at 1323; see generally Note, ControllingJury Damage Awards in PrivateAntitrust
Suits, 81 MICii. L. REV. 693 (1983).
'46 See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST
BULL. 5 (1959); Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. REV. 363 (1954); see also Discretionary Treble Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits: Hearing on H.R. 4597 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter cited as DiscretionaryHearings].
147 Dorman, The Case for Compensation: Why Compensatory Components are Requiredfor
Efficient Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118-19 (1980). Indeed, this is only the
other side of the coin noted by Antitrust Penalties: the tendency of juries to favor small private
plaintiffs against their typically larger adversaries. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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ever, show that there are disadvantages, in purely economic efficiency
terms, to a monopoly public enforcement scheme,14 and advantages
to a multipronged system. Indeed, much of the Antitrust Division's
success in obtaining consent decrees may be due to the fact that such
decrees-unlike litigated judgments-may not be utilized as prima
facie evidence in private actions.1 49 At least absent empirical evidence
of present overenforcement, the very existence of many enforcers may
be a real benefit, solely in terms of deterrent effect, and one which is
enhanced by the fact that private interests diverge from public interests in ways which ensure a fuller presentation of enforcement options
to the courts.
While it is probable that the present multipronged enforcement
scheme does not have precisely the correct "mix" to ensure optimal
enforcement, the difficulties of measuring and balancing the conflicting tendencies are obvious. As a result, there may be more than a
grain of wisdom in the current approach. Whatever its defects, it has
safeguards against the egregious errors of underenforcement, whether
by design or mistake, while leaving to the courts the responsibility of
barring overenforcement by substantive, procedural, and remedial
doctrines. Finally, the fairness appeal of a compensation-oriented
scheme is strong. Employed purely as a tie-breaker, fairness might
compel continuation of essentially the present approach, at least until
it has been empirically demonstrated to be inefficient. Indeed, some
such concerns underlie a second "economic" approach to reforming
the private suit, that of Professor Schwartz.
B. The Schwartz Proposal
A somewhat less radical "economic" suggestion for altering the
private remedy has been forwarded by Professor Warren F.
Schwartz. 50 Basically, he perceives fundamental deficiencies in the
present scheme of private enforcement but is unwilling to shift to
"I This result could be traced to the transaction cost factor. The effect of shifting to a pure
government scheme is to put some of the costs of violations on the victims by eliminating
compensation to them. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. Theoretically, they should
be able to either bribe the violator not to act illegally or somehow convince the government to
sue. The problem is simply that the victims may not be able to efficiently organize themselves to
do so because of high transaction costs. Ultimately, the government must act as their surrogate in
order to maximize efficiency. In many cases, however, the government may not be able (or
willing) to do so,
"1 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982); Bicks, supra note 146, at 8 & n.5.
1-1 Schwartz, supra note 40. For Schwartz, "efficiency" in enforcement can be utilized to
examine even the definition of substantive violations, and therefore he explores issues going
beyond the interplay of public and private enforcement which is our present concern. Most
notably, he considers the efficiency considerations involved in the substantive decision whether
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monopoly government enforcement because of uncertainty about the
' 5
reality as opposed to the "ideal of optimal public enforcement."' '
Instead, Schwartz would retain a mixed system of public and private
enforcement but alter the private remedy in order to enhance its
efficiency. In formulating his proposal, Schwartz both agrees and
disagrees with portions of the Elzinga and Breit analysis.
The basis of Schwartz's analysis is a "cost minimization approach," that is, reducing to the minimum the costs of enforcement in
terms of (1) the costs of the harmful conduct being proscribed; (2) the
process costs of catching and trying violators, including the risk of
erroneously convicting an innocent person; and (3) the costs of punishing the persons found guilty. 52 The theoretical point he shares with
Elzinga and Breit is that penalties can either underdeter or overdeter.151 That is, too little of the harmful conduct may be prevented
(because the costs to society of increased enforcement are less than the
costs of the remaining undeterred conduct) or too much harmful
conduct may be prevented (as when the costs to society of the violation are less than the process and punishment costs incurred in attack54
ing it). 1
For Schwartz, there should be an enforcement scheme which will
achieve the right "price" for violations:
The essential notion of the cost-minimization approach is that the
incidence of harmful conduct should be reduced to an efficient
level by incurring an efficient quantity of process and punishment
cost. The "price" for engaging in proscribed activities is determined
by multiplying the magnitude of the sanction by the probability
that it will be imposed if the law is violated. This price must be set
correctly lest society incur excessive costs. If the price is insufficient, too much of the undesirable conduct will occur because not
enough resources will be expended to reduce the incidence of the
harmful conduct. Conversely, if the price is too high, too little of
the undesirable conduct will occur; too much will be spent on law
enforcement. Thus, a price which is either too high or too low
55
imposes excessive costs.1
to adopt a per se rule or a rule of reason. Id. at 1087-91. He also addresses the economics of
assigning responsibility for litigation costs, and the appropriateness of the present system allowing a prevailing private plaintiff to recover its costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, while
leaving the defendant, even when it prevails, uncompensated. Id. at 1100-01.
l"lId. at 1093.
512Id. at 1076. Schwartz draws on the work of Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic

Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
' Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1079-80.
154 Id.

1I1Id. (emphasis in original).
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Setting the right price, however, requires an appreciation of both
the social costs of the violation and the total process and punishment
costs. It is only in light of these factors that the right balance can be
struck. Moreover, as Schwartz clearly recognizes, the cost-minimization approach, which is desirable because it takes into account all
relevant factors, is a "methodological nightmare" precisely because of
the difficulty of balancing all factors.' 5 6 Further, he recognizes that
there are serious problems in obtaining the empirical data for applying the cost-minimization approach.' 57 Schwartz also notes another
complication: while setting the right price is difficult when "efficiency" is the only relevant goal, it is possible that other goals which
increase the difficulty of pricing enormously 158 must also be taken into
account, including compensation to injured persons.
Focusing on efficiency as the only goal, however, Schwartz argues that it is appropriate to consider only the harm caused by the
antitrust violation, not the gains accruing to the violator, as the
measure of the social cost of the violation.' 59 The reason for this
approach is, apparently, that the monopolist's gain does not necessarily correlate with the social loss entailed in resources wasted by the
defendant's seeking monopoly prices, and in the misallocation of resources associated with monopoly pricing.'6 0 As a practical matter,
however, Schwartz surmises that the "harms" focus will usually yield
a higher figure than a "gain" oriented approach.' 6 '
Given this definition of harm, Schwartz believes that a private
enforcement scheme presents unique difficulties:

" Id. at 1078.

151Id. at 1079; see generally Reynolds, supra note 40. For example, Schwartz considers the
cost of monopoly to be twofold: first, the resources used by a monopolist to obtain the monopoly,
and, second, the welfare loss resulting from the higher price. Even assuming the latter element
could be computed by hypothesizing the competitive price that would be charged absent the
monopoly, the difficulties of ascertaining how much the monopoly cost to obtain are obvious.
Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1084-85. And even if the social costs can be ascertained, no
meaningful balancing can take place until the process and punishment costs are determined. See
supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
,s Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1085-87.
's
Id. at 1082.
60 Id. at 1082 & n.27. According to Schwartz, these damages, whether they are recovered by
consumers who have had to pay a monopoly price instead of a competitive price or by competitors who have been hurt by the violator's efforts to obtain the monopoly, do not track the basic
social harm caused by monopoly-the misallocation of resources. Indeed, "the allocative harm
caused by monopoly pricing does not constitute legally cognizable damages to any plaintiff." Id.
at 1084. Nor does Schwartz believe that the damages which are recoverable constitute even a
reasonable proxy for the harms caused by antitrust violations.
"I,Id. at 1083.
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First, the sum awarded to the plaintiff serves both as an incentive
for maintaining the action and as a penalty imposed on the defendant. Only one variable-the penalty-is fixed directly, but a second variable-the intensity of enforcement-is determined indirectly through the incentives to potential private enforcers
engendered by the system. Thus, defining the allowable damages
determines both the magnitude of the sanction and the frequency
of its imposition. The dependence of these two variables makes it
62
impossible to adjust the system optimally.
The example given applies only when costs of deterrence have risen.
Ideally, one might raise the penalty but decrease the incidence of
prosecution; if done correctly, the same level of deterrence should be
achieved with fewer process costs. With a private compensation
scheme, however, the increase in the penalty will serve as an incentive
6 3
which will actually lead to more enforcement.
Theoretically, public enforcement can avoid this problem since
the prosecutor is not motivated by obtaining the penalty imposed on
the defendant.16 4 Schwartz, however, is sufficiently concerned about
the reality (as opposed to the theoretical model) of public enforcement 65 that he does not join Antitrust Penalties in recommending the
abolition of private enforcement. Rather, he would simply "eliminate
the present equivalence between the sum awarded to the plaintiff and
that taken from the defendant." 1 66 The sum awarded to the plaintiff
would, in short, become an "enforcement incentive," not compensation.
This proposal, as Schwartz admits, would require some safeguards. Most notably, a method would have to be devised for preventing trading between plaintiff and defendant which comes about because the plaintiff's incentive award may be less than the defendant's

162 Id. at 1092 (footnotes omitted). Schwartz's analysis in this regard tracks that of two
commentators who purport to demonstrate that "private enforcement is less efficient than
optimum public enforcement." Landes & Posner, supra note 127, at 15. They basically argue
that potential violators will discount any fine by the fact that apprehension and conviction will
not follow every violation. To offset this discount factor to achieve adequate deterrence one may
raise the fine. That, however, provides incentive for overenforcement. But even these authors
recognize that this tendency does not establish a case for preferring public to private enforcement: "That would require a comparison between private and actual, not optimal, public
enforcement .. ."Id. at 15-16.
163 Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1092. Similarly, Schwartz is concerned that the very effectiveness of private enforcement, by reducing the number of violations, may drive enforcement costs
up for the remaining violators. Id. at 1092-93.
'1
Id. at 1093.
15 Id; see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
6' Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1093.
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liability. 6 7 Accordingly, both would be better off if an intermediate
settlement were reached. It is, of course, scarcely clear that an effective mechanism to this end could be established.16 8 Further, Schwartz
concedes that such an approach, which would constitute essentially a
bounty-hunter system, would require a redefinition of lawyer roles, 6 9
and the development of methods of determining priorities among the
70
bounty hunters. 1
Although there are serious problems with the mechanics of the
Schwartz proposal,' 7 ' the primary difficulty is not with the epicycles
which are required to make this model work, but rather with the
central idea. The concept requires someone to set both an incentive
figure and a penalty figure. Aside from the formidable problems of
data collection which must be solved for anyone to do this rationally,
the process problems seem insurmountable. Schwartz envisions judges
and/or juries doing so in individual cases, 172 but that is almost certainly not feasible. On a practical level, this aspect of the case would
dwarf the liability phase; indeed, the extensive discovery that would
be required for a judge or jury to make such a determination would
make the normal antitrust suit seem simple. On a conceptual level,
the results that are sought would be totally amorphous since the
variables are both numberous and interdependent.
Imagine, for example, a simple price-fixing suit by a customer of
one of the violators. In the present scheme, the liability question

"I Id. at 1095. To allow such trades will result in recovery of more than the optimal
incentives for the plaintiff, and payment of less than the optimal penalty by the defendant.
168 The example cited by Schwartz of a mechanism to control trades is the requirement of
court approval which governs class action settlements and derivative suit settlements. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(e) and 23.1. The efficacy of court supervision in this area, which is mainly to prevent
attorneys and named plaintiffs from disproportionately benefitting vis-a-vis the class whose
rights they are asserting, is dubious. See Latimer, Damages, Settlements and Attorneys' Fees in
Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST L. J. 1553 (1982).
169Latimer, supra note 168, at 1094.
170Id. at 1096-1100.
171 One such problem is the situation where the incentive needed to reward a successful
plaintiff is more than the amount needed to deter. Suppose an antitrust violation exists with a
social cost of $1,000,000 but which costs no particular victim more than $1,000 and which
profits the violator only $100,000. Assuming a 50% chance of being caught and convicted, no
rational person will violate the law if the penalty is $200,000. But if enforcement costs are
$250,000, no private party will sue unless the sum to be recovered is in excess of the penalty. If no
one sues, the chances of being punished diminish to zero, and the social cost of $1,000,000 will be
imposed.
Schwartz might, of course, respond that it is these kinds of violations where public enforcement is appropriate. But, given the uncertainty he posits about government enforcement, it is
not clear why the private remedy should not be structured to encourage enforcement.
"IgId. at 1095.
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would be complicated only by the remedial problem of determining
the difference between the price fixed and the hypothetical competitive price that should have prevailed. Although there are obvious
problems with determining a "competitive" price which may never
have existed, the fact-finder, having made this reconstruction of history, need only multiply that difference by the number of units
bought by the customer, add any consequential damages which might
be indicated, and treble the result.
Under the Schwartz scheme, the liability phase would be the
same. The remedial phase, however, would be a litigation nightmare.
First, the act-finder must decide the appropriate penalty for the violator. This is done by computing the social harm caused and then setting
a figure which, when discounted by the chances of the violator being
caught, will result in the optimal level of deterrence. Ignoring for a
moment what that level is (and it can be resolved only after the
incentive award is decided), the social harm determination is much
more complicated than establishing a hypothetical "competitive
price" since some estimate of the costs of seeking monopoly must also
be made. And even if "social cost" is decided, there is still the difficulty of determining the discount factor. That, of course, is almost
certainly empirically indeterminable since those who violate the law
have no incentive to admit it. Yet, despite being indeterminate, the
discount factor is critical since relatively modest adjustments in it will
grossly affect the ultimate penalty.
Moreover, the entire determination of a penalty is contingent on
the incentive award. A small award will decrease the number of suits,
thereby decreasing the amount of deterrence; conversely, a large
award will tend to increase private enforcement. Thus, the discount
factor interacts with the incentive award. But the incentive award has
to take into account the costs of enforcement (presumably not only in
the suit being adjudicated but more generally). The point is not that
there are no mathematical models which will yield the correct answer; rather, it is that, even granting that such models exist or can be
developed, the data is simply not available to yield the kind of accuracy that the Schwartz proposal requires in order to be effective.
In sum, neither the Elzinga and Breit proposal to replace private
enforcement with an exclusive governmental remedy, nor the
Schwartz proposal to shift from a private, compensation-oriented
remedy to a bounty-hunting approach is desirable, particularly at this
stage of development of antitrust economics. Once again, the trebledamage approach, whatever its theoretical shortcomings, may be the
best alternative to the problems of antitrust enforcement.
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AS A LIMITATION ON TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS

While economists have attacked the treble damage device on
"efficiency" grounds, legal scholars have launched an assault based on
"fairness" considerations.1 3 Clearly, fairness is a central concern in
fashioning legal remedies. 74 Indeed, the previous section rejected the
efficiency challenge of Professors Elzinga and Breit in part because of
fairness implications for plaintiffs. Professors Areeda and Turner,
however, would impose restrictions on the treble damage suit because
75
of perceived unfairness to defendants.1
A general theme of the Areeda and Turner treatise, Antitrust
Law, is that government enforcement is preferable to private suit, an
idea which finds expression in several recommendations. 78 The
broader reaches of this approach are beyond the scope of this piece,
although it might be questioned whether Areeda and Turner-like

i71Another area in which efforts to accord "fairness" to defendants may have adverse effects
on plaintiffs' suits is the continuing controversy over contribution among antitrust violators.
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) held that there was no basis in
federal statutory or common law for allowing federal courts to fashion a right to contribution.
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1982); see generally
Bernard, On Judgments and Settlements in Antitrust Litigation: When Should Damages be
Trebled?, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1 (1981); Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution
and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 42 (1980);
Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 331 (1980); Polinsky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim
Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1981).
Three bills have been introduced in the Senate within the past year which would provide for
contribution of damages: S. 904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); S.995, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
174 The textual discussion focuses on fairness to the antitrust defendant as a single economic
and legal entity. It has sometimes been suggested that the propriety of punitive damage awards
ought to be reconsidered in the context of the modern corporation. The argument is that, since
the damage award will injure shareholders who are innocent of the wrongdoing, and perhaps
even powerless to stop it, punitive damages may be inappropriate. See generally Owen, Punitive
Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1299-1308 (1976).
The most obvious response to this is that those who stand to benefit should shoulder the
risks. From a fairness perspective, the possibility of an antitrust judgment is merely one of the
risks inherent in the investment. From an efficiency perspective, this novel variety of "piercing
the corporate veil" to save innocent stockholders would effectively exempt all large corporations
from the otherwise appropriate liability for their actions, thereby removing an incentive for
them to obey the law. If treble damages are otherwise justified, the innocent stockholder
problem is no reason to reject the remedy.
7 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at

331b.

For example, the authors' discussion of monopolization law suggests a broader rule of
liability where the suit is a government action in equity than would apply to either a criminal
proceeding or a treble damage action. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNE, supra note 33, at
311-13.
Another indication of this preference is the suggested limitations on private equitable relief as
compared to public suits. Id. at 331b.
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Elzinga and Breit-do not exaggerate the advantages of disinterested
public enforcement and underestimate its disadvantages. 177 The focus
of present concern, however, is the proposal in Antitrust Law that the
courts treat the "trebling" feature of section four of the Clayton Act as
"discretionary," utilizing that discretion to sometimes limit the award
to single damages. 7 8 If taken seriously, this proposal would be likely
to sharply tilt antitrust towards the exclusive government enforcement
which Elzinga and Breit proposed.
The idea of discretionary treble damages did not originate with
9 The recommendation had previously
Professors Areeda and Turner. 17
been the subject of Congressional hearings' 80 and appeared in the
1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws:' 8 ' "On balance, we favor vesting in the trial judge
discretion to impose double or treble damages. In all instances, this
would recompense injured parties. Beyond compensation, the trial
court could then penalize the purposeful violator without imposing
the harsh penalty of multiple damages on innocent actors."'182 One
major difference between this proposal and the Areeda-Turner approach is that the Committee's Report apparently envisioned that
legislative change would achieve the suggested reform while Antitrust
Law argues that the judiciary can find room in the statute itself. The

"I See generally Zimmer

& Sullivan, supra note 122.
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at 331b.
179 See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 6, at 64-66 for a brief history of the evolution of
the treble damage provision.
180See DiscretionaryHearings, supra note 146. It is also apparently endorsed in M. HANDLER,
H. BLAKE, B. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 153-54
(2d ed. 1983). Professor Posner also suggests a form of "discretionary" trebling, although he
would differentiate, on the basis of "a theory of sanctions," between more concealable and less
concealable violations. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 231 (1976). He
argues that the latter do not warrant the trebling necessary for adequate deterrence. Id.
Perhaps worthy of separate note is the argument that mandatory trebling works to plaintiffs' disadvantages by making it more difficult for judges and juries to convict. Bicks, The
Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 14 (1959). See
also Baker, Reagan AdministrationProposalOpens Debate on Treble Damages, 5 NAT'L L. J. 5,
May 9, 1983, at 20, which is discussed infra note 232. Whatever the merits of the argument,
however, it would support making treble damages "discretionary" at the plaintiff's option (with
notification to judge and jury); it offers no reason to vest discretion in the trial judge.
181Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Report]. This recommendation did not pass unchallenged. See McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 342, 343
(1955) (arguing that courts' exercise of discretion with respect to such issues as proof of damages
did not bode well for plaintiffs); Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 55
(1955).
182 Attorney General'sReport, supra note 181, at 379.
178
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analysis in Antitrust Law is weak on this point 183 despite some limited
case support. 184 Nevertheless, the real question is not the method of
revising the law but whether the law needs revising. 185

"I Antitrust Law concedes that the statutory language "seems to leave little room for judicial
discretion," 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNERi, supra note 33, at 331(b)(3), but nevertheless argues for
implied qualifications "in infrequent situations not within the contemplation of those who wrote
the statute and . . . where qualification would best serve both the fundamental purposes of the
statute and the ends of justice." Id. The former principle has some appeal, although the
difficulties of applying it are obvious. The latter, however, is too open-ended: it would permit
courts to rewrite express statutory commands whenever broader policies, whether derived from
the more general purposes of the statute or the ends of justice, would so indicate.
While some accommodation of statutory language is permissible, as to avoid unconstitutionality, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), or to accommodate other
statutory schemes, see, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at § 177, the broader View advocated by
Professors Areeda and Turner has never been recognized. Indeed, the statutory scheme created
by Congress generally defines the "purposes of the statute" and "the ends of justice." See United
Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). Put another way: Congress has determined that,
generally speaking at least, treble damage recovery for violations is one goal of the statute and isnot unjust.
An ingenious effort to provide a single damage antitrust remedy is set forth in Arnold,
Implied Right of Action Under the Antitrust Laws, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 437, 470 (1979)
(suggesting "[a]n implied remedy for nontreble damages [which] would comport with the
compensatory policy underlying the antitrust laws").
"I' While no case directly holds that treble damages are "discretionary," there are holdings
that the award is not necessarily mandatory when federal policies are contrary to treble liability.
Thus, in Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979),
vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), and remanded in light of NLRB v. Longshoremen, 447 U.S. 490
(1980), Judge Gibbons attempted to reconcile federal antitrust and labor law policies by narrowing the circumstances warranting treble damage liability. See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp..
463 F. Supp. 983, 998 (D. Conn. 1979) (accommodating federal patent and antitrust laws by
holding that "some patent-related conduct creates antitrust liability only for prospective equitable relief, but not for treble damage remedies, at least in some circumstances"), vacated on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court has never held that the treble damage award is not mandatory, and at
least Justice Blackmun appears to believe it is. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442-43 (1978). The Court, however, may have at least held the question open
in that case, id. at 401-02, and in its subsequent decision in Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.20 (1982). See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579, 599 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stevens, Brennan, White and Marshall).
Even if it should be held that the award is not mandatory, the limited nature of the
exceptions contemplated seems clear. The Consolidated Express and SCM courts would subordinate the treble damage award only to accommodate conflicting federal statutory policies.
Likewise in Lafayette and Cantor the point raised was whether the concept of federalism should
mitigate the strict application of the treble damage remedy. Neither of these exemptions would
justify making the award "discretionary" in any generalized sense.
Still another possible argument for limiting treble damages is the change of law situation
either by way of a defense to damage liability or by prospective overruling. See generally Ross,
Recognizing the Reliance Interest in Awarding Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Of
Mitigation and Prospectivity, 12 GA. L. REV. 193 (1978). Again, accepting such a theory would
be far from a generalized notion of discretionary' treble damages. See infra note 210.
"5 When convinced in particular instances that treble damage suits may deter desirable
conduct, Congress has chosen to limit private suits to actual damages. Export Trading Company
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The basic argument of Professors Areeda and Turner is straightforward: the purpose of treble damages is punitive; in some situations
punitive damages are inappropriate; therefore, in some situations
treble damages ought not to be awarded. The links in this reasoning
must be closely examined.
Initially, it is necessary to consider the assertion that the treble
damage award is "punitive." Areeda and Turner argue, first, that
even single damages can "punish" a defendant "who could not reasonably have foreseen liability,"' 8 6 and, secondly, that "treble damages
are indisputably punishment. 18 7 The usage of "punitive" with respect
to single damages is objectionable. While one subjected to a money
judgment may well feel punished by the legal system, the traditional
line of demarcation for "punitive damages" is drawn with reference to
compensation: a compensatory award is not punitive, without regard
to the moral fault (or lack of it) of the defendant. An obvious example
is strict liability offenses in tort.188
If this view undercuts the argument that single damages are
"punishment," it seems to reinforce the notion that treble damages are
punitive. Even this, however, is not necessarily true since "damages"
as a legal concept is often narrower than actual harm. Occasionally
Congress has recognized this by authorizing the award of sums in
excess of damages actually proven. This has been done not to punish
the defendant for wrongful conduct but rather to provide a roughand-ready measure of compensation for real but unquantifiable damages. A prime example is the "liquidated damages" provision found in
some employment discrimination contexts,8 9 which has been held to
have a compensatory purpose rather than a punitive one.'

Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021

(1982)).
1

187

2 P.
Id.
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supra note 33, at

311b.

,88See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 (4th ed. 1971).

"I Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see generally C.
M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, THE FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 10.15, at 668-74 (1980).
191Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942). It is true that even "pure"
punitive damages are sometimes defended on the basis of compensation of unprovable losses and
reimbursement for attorneys' fee. See generally Owen, supra note 174, at 1295-99. Nevertheless,
this result seems more a byproduct of the basic purposes of punishment and deterrence rather
than a separate goal of the award. Otherwise, it is hard to account for the general judicial
reluctance to expand the recovery of attorneys' fees. Alyeska Pipe Line Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
SULLIVAN,

421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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Much the same could be said about the treble damage award.' 9
It seems certain that single damages, as presently measured by the
law, will undercompensate. This is due to several factors, including
the absence of either an adjustment for inflation or the general availability of prejudgment interest. 192 Further, although the courts have
liberalized the rules for proving the amount of damage suffered as a
result of an antitrust violation, it remains difficult to establish many
elements of damage with sufficient certainty. 193 Indeed, the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois Brick19 4 denying indirect purchasers general
standing to seek treble damages was predicated largely on the proof of
damage problem. Although such problems are exacerbated in the
"passing on" context, the holding in Illinois Brick may well result in
particular cases in which the only parties damaged are not able to sue
while the only parties able to sue are not damaged. Such an odd
result, whether or not sound, 9 5 underscores the problems of proof of
the quantum of antitrust damages. In this light, the suggestion that
the trebling feature could be viewed as a means of compensating
unquantifiable damages deserves serious consideration.
But even if the treble damage award is punitive, it does not
follow that punitive damages are not justifiable. Professors Areeda
and Turner conclude that a penalty would be unfair in some casesprimarily those in which the defendant could not reasonably have
foreseen that its conduct was wrongful. Therefore, they conclude that
the punitive trebling feature ought to be discretionary.
There are several responses to this argument. First, it could be
met head-on by conceding unfairness in imposing treble damages on
an "innocent" wrongdoer but arguing that the need to encourage
private suits is the more compelling consideration. This is, of course,
" Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.
J. 117, 157-58 (1940). Contra Owen, supra note 174, at 1262 n.17 ("treble damages under the
antitrust laws are in the nature of punitive damages and achieve similar objectives"); see also
North Carolina Theatres, Inc. v. Thompson, 277 F.2d 673, 676-77 (4th Cir. 1960) (private
action to recover treble damages is an action to recover a "penalty" for purposes of state statute
of limitations).
1'2See Blair, Antitrust Penalties:Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 57. The
author recommends replacing the trebling feature with a provision expanding the concept of
damages to embrace prejudgment interest and an inflation allowance. Id. at 70-71. A narrow
step towards prejudgment interest was taken by Congress in 1980, but such recovery remains
generally unavailable. See infra note 212. Interestingly, the Reagan Administration proposal for
single damages for some antitrust violation does provide for an interest award. Presidents
Proposal, supra note 3, at 713; see infra note 228 for text of proposed amendment.
"13 See generally supra note 13.
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
'9 See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
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an "efficiency" argument which is predicated on the notion that the
punitive aspect of the treble damage award has as its primary purpose
1 96
the encouragement of "private attorney general" suits.
The need for such suits stems from elementary economic reasoning that potential lawbreakers will discount any costs of a violation by
the improbability of getting caught.197 The trebling feature may,
then, reflect an effort to offset the discount factors in order to achieve
the proper level of detection. One must agree with Professor Posner
that the particular multiplier of three was chosen "without any effort
to determine whether the probability . .. that a violator will be
caught is anywhere near .33."198 Posner, however, admits the near
impossibility of accurately estimating the chances of getting caught."19
As a result, criticism of the .33 figure as too low a probability is no
more persuasive than claims that it is too high. While it may be true,
as Posner argues, that the success of concealment varies with the kind
of offense involved, 20 0 the impossibility of a precise calculus in any
area may support the rough-and-ready congressional trebling.
Such an efficiency-oriented argument can look to legal precedent for support. Strict liability, for instance, is well-known to the
law, and is even found in the criminal area.20 1 Indeed, there is support
for this argument in recent antitrust jurisprudence; Illinois Brick was
in large part based on considerations of efficient enforcement. 20 2 Nor
does the trebling feature suggest a different result. Under the Areeda
101
The following discussion parallels that applicable to the question of whether a defense for
"'avulsive" change in the law should be allowed. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuiRNER, supra note 33, at
322(f); see also Ross, supra note 184. While it seems most unfair to impose treble damages on a
defendant for conduct which it had no substantial reason to believe was unlawful, recognition of
such a defense would severely reduce the incentives for private plaintiffs to break new ground in
antitrust theory or application. Of course, if a "'changein law" defense were to be recognized, it
would severely reduce the "need" for discretionary trebling by removing the class of defendants
most deserving of protection from treble damage liability.
"I Indeed, this reasoning is too elementary. Natural persons frequently act nonrationally, and
institutional reactions are even more difficult to predict, since institutions are composed of
multiple decisionmakers whose interests, and perceptions of the institution's interests, may vary
widely. See Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J.
1091 (1976); Wheeler, supra note 41, at 1343-46. What would deter a rational institution will
not necessarily deter a real firm since actual conduct will be influenced or determined by persons
whose interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the firm itself. See Blair, Antitrust
Penalties: Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 57.
'98 R. PosNER, supra note 180, at 226.
19 Id.

Id. at 224-27.
I"' See W. LAFAVE & A. SCO1-,

200

CRIMINAL LAW

§ 6 (1972); see also United States v. United

States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388-89 (1947) (addressing the intent concept in the context of
a criminal antitrust case).
202 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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and Turner approach, intentional violators would in any event remain subject to discretionary multiple liability, and in the exercise of
such discretion, it is precisely with respect to the "unwitting" defendant that the "bounty" aspect of the private antitrust action becomes
most critical. By definition, "unwitting" violators have little reason to
believe their conduct is illegal. For a private plaintiff to prevail, then,
he or she must advance novel theories or novel applications of accepted theories. That, in turn, sharply increases the risks and costs of
litigation. Accordingly, if there is a need to encourage such private
enforcement, 20 3 efficiency demands may well outweigh the "unfair-

203 Whether there is such a need depends on two considerations. First, whether the amount of

government antitrust enforcement is already optimal; and second, whether private attorneys
general, will, on balance, produce good results by their innovative actions. Neither question is
empirically answerable, but the general utility of private actions seems probable, and the very
existence of the treble damage scheme requires recognition of that judgment by Congress.
Consider:
(1) Optimal Enforcement
Elzinga and Breit in Antitrust Penalties devote considerable effort to graphically demonstrating the obvious proposition that there can be either too much or too little enforcement for
efficiency. K. ELZINGA & W. BRErT, supra note 6, at 13. They, however, then note that,
"[p]recisely where the United States is in regard to [optimal enforcement] is, of course, a most
difficult matter to determine," with support for both sides of the question. Id. It may' be useful to
stress, however, that even conservative estimates of the losses due to monopoly, see generally F.
SCHEREB, supra note 68, at 459-74, far exceeded the annual budget of the Antitrust Division
which was $41,200,000 for fiscal year 1982. Of course, the expenditures of the Division are
scarcely the only relevant costs of enforcement and the notorious methodological problems make
real reliance on estimates of aggregate monopoly loss treacherous. Nevertheless, they provide
some basis for suggesting that we do not nowv have overenforcement or even optimal enforcement. See Loevinger, PrivateAction- The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITHUST BULL. 167
(1958).
(2) Cost-Benefits
Even assuming less-than-optimal public enforcement, it is possible that private suits will
lead to overenforcement in terms of cost-benefit analysis. See supra note 136. Further. one of the
"costs" of private enforcement is the possibility of "'erroneous" legal theories being accepted by
the courts, at least some of which may be anticompetitive. One case frequently cited as an
example of this is Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Pie Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). While this
constitutes a rational reason to oppose treble damage suits, especially those against "unwitting"
violators, the significance of any such danger depends on the confluence of two factors. First, one
must determine the likelihood that government enforcers will be correct in their judgment.
Professors Areeda and Turner give great deference to the wisdom of the Antitrust Division: it is
perhaps not merely coincidental that Professor Turner once ran it. If they are correct, private
suits on innovative theories are less important: most innovations will be wrong. They can
therefore view without alarm the adverse impact adoption of their proposals would have on
private-suits. E.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at 322e. The second factor is the
extent to which courts can be trusted to make correct policy choices in litigation. Critics like
Robert Bork might well distrust private suits and wish to confine their scope because they despair
about the competence of the courts and believe that it will be easier to "educate" one entity-the
Antitrust Division-than hundreds of federal judges. R. Bonr, supra note 44.
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4
ness" of treble damage recovery against an "unwitting" defendant. 20
Further, mandatory trebling may be a necessary incentive for two
reasons. First, there is little reason to expect judges, in the exercise of
the discretion that Areeda and Turner would accord them, to reward
private plaintiffs at the expense of innocent defendants. 20 5 Secondly,
direct empirical support for the view that treble damages are a necessary incentive may be drawn from the fact that only single damages
are available to the United States for harms to it in its proprietary
capacity. 20 " The paucity of such suits, even against defendants who
have been sued in criminal or equitable cases, 20 7 suggests that the
20 8
government rarely views the single damage game as worthwhile.
This economic efficiency defense of the automatic trebling feature will not be pursued further, however, since an important theme
of Part II of this article is that efficiency is not the paramount societal
goal. Areeda and Turner quite rightly put the fairness issue on center
stage, and any defense of automatic trebling must come to grips with
it. Fairness arguments, however, are usually at least two-faceted. The

204 See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13 (1969) (not inequitable to apply retrospectively
rule that conduct of defendant was prohibited form of price-fixing since the rule announced was
not innovative and cause of action against defendant has been established). Oddly enough,
private suits have frequently been criticized as not being innovative enough on t:ie grounds that
most private plaintiffs "follow in the government's footsteps" by attacking basically those violations which have been the object of government proceedings. Although it is true that the bulk of
private litigation has followed government action, significant recoveries have been obtained in
cases in which the government did not blaze the trail. See L. ScHwARrz, J. FLYNN & H. FiRsT,
FREE ENrERM~s
AND ECONOMIC OBCANIZATION 22 (6th ed. 1983); see also Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975; Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, 371-86 (1975) (statement of Peter
Max).
205 For example, the courts have frequently been reluctant to impose either the maximum
monetary criminal fines or meaningful prison sentences in antitrust cases. See supra notes 132-41
and accompanying text. Since these cases usually involve the most flagrant violations of the
antitrust laws, it seems unlikely that the judiciary could be entrusted to exercise its discretion to
award multiple damages even in cases of flagrant violations. To the extent that the violations are
less clear, it would be foolish, on the basis of past experience, to anticipate that awards would
often exceed actual damages, regardless of the theoretic justification for a higher judgment.
z0 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). This provision was added in 1955, 69 Stat. 282, after the
Supreme Court held that the United States was not a "person" for purposes of treble damages.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
107 While the numbers of reported cases involving 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) are not a perfect measure
of the frequency of the use of that section, the paucity of citations strongly suggests that the
Department of Justice has not often invoked the provision.
201 An alternative interpretation-that the paucity of suits results from governmental inefficiency in pursuing viable damage claims-would scarcely support the Areeda and Turner
general preference for governmental over private enforcement, nor the reliance on exclusive
government enforcement by Elzinga and Breit. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33; K.
ELZINCA & W. BREIT, supra note 6.
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first facet is unfairness to the defendants. Put simply, the thesis of this
article is that treble damages are rarely or never unfair to defendants
in light of two important factors.
First, it is unlikely that "unwitting" violators frequently exist.
One might expect a spectrum of law violators, ranging from someone
approaching Justice Holmes' "bad man" 2 09 -the person who knew
beyond doubt that his conduct was wrongful but hoped to escape
detection-to the "good guy"-one who thought beyond doubt his
conduct was lawful. In between lie persons with more or less uncertainty about the legitimacy of their conduct. In antitrust cases, oriented as they are towards large businesses with huge cadres of lawyers, the totally unwitting defendant will be a rarity. In the typical
situation the defendant will have had knowledge of possible illegality
and have taken a chance on the outcome. The fact that the judgment
as to legality may have been reasonable when made does not detract
from the fact that the defendant knew or should have known of the
risks and chose to assume them in return for the business benefits
210
which resulted.
Second, a treble damage award may not be "unfair" even to a
totally innocent defendant. The "unfairness" of an award ultimately
turns on the relationship of plaintiff's gain to defendant's loss. If every
dollar of damage suffered by plaintiff went into defendant's pocket by
virtue of the antitrust violation, single damage recovery would exactly
redress an inequity; indeed, it could be viewed as akin to restitution
for unjust enrichment. From this perspective, it is irrelevant that the
"unjustness" of the enrichment was not, or could not reasonably have
been, known to the defendant before the occurrence of the conduct
ultimately held illegal. Under this model, however, treble damages
are unfair: the twofold add-on cannot be justified, either as a penalty
(since the unwitting defendant has, by definition, done nothing deserving of punishment per se) or as compensation (since the plaintiff,
by definition, has been made whole by single damages).
The only problem with this model-which must be the one
Areeda and Turner have in mind-is that it has doubtful congruence
with reality. The thesis on this point can be put simply in restitution
terms: there is grave reason to doubt that the antitrust damages
"disgorged" by a violator will exceed his "unjust enrichment." It is, of

201 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARH. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
20 Professors Areeda and Turner recognize this in their discussion of a possible "avulsive"

change-in-law defense to a private damage claim. 2 P.
322f.
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course, true that the antitrust laws award damages, not restitution;
nevertheless, restitution analysis is helpful in seeing that unfairness to
defendants is improbable if not impossible in the treble damage remedy. And the use of restitutionary concepts in analyzing treble damage
21
questions has strong precedential support.
To understand this, it is essential to shift the focus from the
individual plaintiff's suit to the total harm caused by the violation and
the total gain accruing to the defendant. Although there are factors
which tend to undercut the model, in any event, 21 2 the most telling
point is simply that the class of antitrust plaintiffs is almost always less
than the class of antitrust victims. 21 3 Further, the recovery of antitrust
damages is likely to be less than the amount of harm caused by the
violation. As a result, an award to plaintiffs, even if treble their
damages, will rarely exceed the defendants wrongful gain. Even if up

211 See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). The
Hanover Court rejected the defendant's attempt to defeat a direct purchaser's suit on the
ground that the plaintiff had "passed-on" the overdamage. Id. at 494. In view of the likelihood
that many indirect purchasers would not sue, even if they bore the passed-on overcharge, the
Court found rejection of the defense necessary to prevent "those who violate the antitrust
laws . . . [from] retain[ing] the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would
bring suit against them." Id. But see In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 92 (9th Cir.
1974) ("Congressional scheme does not contemplate that private attorneys are to act as prosecutors to force antitrust violators to disgorge their illegal profits in the general interest of society at
large").
212 First, the legal concept of provable damages is likely to be narrower than actual economic
harm, so some of the double add-on may merely compensate for such losses. See supra notes 19195 and accompanying text. Second, the economic loss to the defendant from an antitrust
judgment is ameliorated by tax benefits, see Wheeler, supra note 41, and by the denial of
prejudgment interest which permits the defendant to retain the economic advantage stemming
from the use of the profits of the violation until judgment. See also Erickson, The Profitabilityof
Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and Treble Damages in PrivateAntitrust, 5 ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REV. 101, 104-07 (1972); Parker, The DeterrentEffect of Treble Damage Suits: Fact
or Fantasy, 3 N.M.L. REV. 286, 288 (1973); Parker, Treble Damage Action-A FinancialDeterrent to Antitrust Violations?. 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483, 486-92 (1971).
It is true that the strength of this latter argument is weakened somewhat by the 1980
amendment to § 4 of the Clayton Act to permit "single interest on actual damages" from the
filing of the complaint to the date of judgment or for any appropriate shorter period, if the
award is found -just" by the court. Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980). The amendment,
however, clearly provides that in determining whether an interest award is just, "the court shall
consider only" three specified factors, all of which essentially concern whether either party
conducted the litigation for purposes of delay. Id. As a result, the statute seems to be more an
effort to encourage expedition in antitrust litigation than a means of compensating the plaintiff
for the loss of use of money during pendency of the suit.
23 See Harris & Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy
Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269, 344-45 (1979) (excessive liability to violators would occur only
if all victims sued and recovered treble their damages).
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to two-thirds of the award could be deemed a windfall to the particu214
lar plaintiff, the unfairness to the defendant is not apparent.
The reasons that the amounts recovered by treble damage plaintiffs are far smaller than the actual harm they suffer are not far to
seek. First, there is the problem of detecting violations which are
typically carefully concealed. Total nondetection, or nondetection
during the limitations period, will exclude large numbers of victims or
plaintiffs. 215 Second, restrictive standing doctrines operate to exclude
216
suits by persons who have sustained real damages from violations.
Third, injuries may well be too diffuse to warrant any one plaintiff
undertaking the risks of an antitrust suit, and the antitrust class action
2 17
offers little relief since its significant erosion by the Burger Court.

21, Cf. Denbeaux, Restitution and Mass Actions: A Solution to the Problems of Class Actions,
10 SETON HALL L. REV. 273 (1979) (arguing that restitution of total unjust enrichment to a
particular plaintiff may be justified in certain cases without regard to relation of award to that
plaintiff's actual damages). The idea advanced here is considerably narrower than that profferred by Professor Denbeaux: the fact that the defendant will usually have an unjust enrichment
exceeding the total of all private plaintiffs' treble damage recoveries suggests that the trebling
feature is not unfair.
215 See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 30, at 847 n.172; see also Owen, supra note 174, at
1292-95. Indeed, Professor Posner suggests limiting trebling on the basis of the concealability of
different types of violations. R. POSNER, supra note 180, at 231.
1'6 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text dealing with "antitrust injury." Another
doctrine restrictive of private suits is the ban on indirect purchaser suits worked by the Court in
Illinois Brick. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. There has been considerable controversy over the correctness of Illinois Brick. Compare Harris & Sullivan, supra note 213, at 272
(calling for congressional overruling of Illinois Brick); Note, Treble Damages and the Indirect
PurchaserProblem: Considerationsfora CongressionalOverruling of Illinois Brick, 39 OHIo ST.
L.J. 545 (1978) with Landes & Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing to Sue Under
the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602
(1979) (concluding that to allow indirect purchasers to sue would retard rather than advance
objectives of antitrust laws).
117 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1976). Even in actions in which broad
class claims have been successful, few class members actually collect their awards. See Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 747 n.31 and authorities cited therein; see also Pomerantz, New Developments
in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded? 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970). Such
considerations have led to suggestions for radical restructuring of Rule 23. See, e.g., Berry,
Ending Substances Indenture to Procedure: The Imperativefor Comprehensive Revision of the
Class Damage Action, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 299 (1980).
It is true that the state parens patriae action created by Congress in 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1982)), offers some hope for the
equivalent of class actions. See generally Panel Discussion, Parens Patriaeand State Antitrust
Efforts in 1978-Everybody's Getting Into the Act, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 1341 (1979);
Whitman, Pareus Patriae:An Effective Consumer Remedy in Antitrust?, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 249
(1976); Comment, ParensPatriaeAntitrust Actions for Treble Damages, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
328 (1977); Note, Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Parens Patriae Act: Paper Tiger or
Sleeping Giant, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 107 (1982). The effectiveness of the parens patriaeaction,
however, has yet to be proven, especially in the wake of the Illinois Brick rejection of indirect
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Finally, the realities of proving damages tend to filter out some harm
that is a clear result of an antitrust violation, thus entirely eliminating
21 8
the claims of some victims and reducing the claims of others.
In sum, although there may be countervailing factors, the great
tendency in antitrust as it functions in practice is to reduce the ratio of
antitrust plaintiffs to antitrust victims and the ratio of antitrust damages to antitrust harms. In light of this fact, it seems likely that no
great unfairness to defendants as a class will result from allowing
treble damages since the plaintiff's recoveries are unlikely to exceed
the defendant's gain.
Several responses to this argument are possible, but are unconvincing. First, it might be countered that the potential for unfairness
remains since all injured parties may sue a particular defendant. But it
is not clear that judges should ignore the fact that there is little
likelihood that all persons will sue, 219 or that a correct legal rule in the
general run of cases should be discarded because of the possibility of
an occasional unfairness. 220 Of course, if one has confidence in the

purchaser suits. See Comment, Parens PatriaeActions on Behalf of Indirect Purchasers:Do They
Survive Illinois Brick?, 34 HASTINcs L.J. 179 (1982).
215 Although other measures are possible, the generally used measure of recovery for pricefixing, for example, is the difference between the competitive price and the illegally fixed price,
multiplied by the number of units purchased, and, of course, trebled. See generally Harrison,
supra note 13; Donovan & Irvine, supra note 13; Lanzillotti, supra note 13. To express this with
econometric rigor:
R = (FP-CP) x N x 3
where R = recovery
FP = fixed price
CP = competitive price
N = number of units
It is an economic commonplace that fewer items will be purchased as the price rises. Thus,
the formula expressed will yield the plaintiff recovery only for the enhanced price of the units it
did buy at a higher-then-competitive price. It does not take into account other losses such as drop
in sales volume. While this element of loss seems theoretically recoverable, Illinois Brick, 431
U.S. at 743 n.27, it will frequently be impossible for the legal system to sufficiently quantify it as
a basis for plaintiff's recovery. In such cases, the actual recovery will not compensate the plaintiff
for her total loss. See R. POSNER, supra note 180, at 224. And this is true despite the serious
misallocation effects in artificially shifting purchases from more desired goods to less desired ones
by virtue of price-fixing.
219 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 n.ll. The Court there found unacceptable the risk that
defendants might pay multiple damages if indirect purchasers and direct purchasers were both
allowed to sue and if procedural devices failed to properly allocate damages between them. Id.
Of course, the present concern is not with duplicate recoveries but whether treble damages may
deprive an "unwitting" defendant of more than its gain from the violation.
220 Note that applying this unfairness criteria on a case-by-case basis is difficult: the total
recovery of all potential plaintiffs will rarely be known when any particular plaintiff sues. The
only case in which this may be clear is where the plaintiff is bringing a class action on behalf of
all victims, none of whom opt out.
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ability of the judicial system to separate the wheat from the chaff, a
more individualized approach is possible. But the imponderables involved in antitrust cases may cut heavily in favor of a general rule
tailored to the majority of cases.
A second argument is that the restitution analogy collapses when
one focuses on the "unjust enrichment" measured not by the increased
price exacted but rather by the increased profits made. Harm to
plaintiffs is not necessarily the reciprocal of benefit to the defendant.
Consider a classic price-fixing case. Treating the defendant cartel as a
unit, the object of the conspiracy will be to fix price/production at a
level that will leave the greatest gap between total revenue and total
cost. This means raising prices above the levels that would obtain
under competitive conditions; but the power to raise prices is limited
by the loss of sales as prices rise and by the effect of the concomitant
production restrictions on costs of producing. In short, 'the benefit of
the cartel may be significantly less than the detriment suffered by
purchasers so that a one dollar increase in the price of each unit might
22
yield only a twenty-five cent addition to profits. '
The response to this is also straightforward. Normal restitution
analysis does not necessarily focus on the defendant's "profits." The
"benefit" or "enrichment" to be disgorged may well be opportunities
obtained. Thus, the defendant who gambles away misappropriated
money will be liable for the value of the money if he loses it and the
profits he makes if he wins. 222 It does not follow, therefore, that the
net profit of the monopolist should be viewed as the benefit it obtains
from its wrongful conduct.
The foregoing discussion may be summarized by noting that
trebling may not exceed compensatory levels or restitutionary disgorgement to the extent that the number of plaintiffs seeking recovery
is substantially less than the number of persons injured and plaintiffs'
cognizable damages are often substantially less than the injury they
actually suffer. While no one can ever be sure that trebling (as opposed to doubling or quadrupling) is the best measure of this, it may
well serve to do rough justice. Indeed, if there is one thing which
seems clear, it is that single damages would be overgenerous to de-

12 The textual discussion focuses on the harm done by a monopoly to purchasers simply in
terms of the price increases they are forced to bear. Given the legal view of antitrust damages,
this is entirely appropriate. One could, however, approach the monopoly problem from the
economic perspective of "welfare loss" of "consumer surplus." Here, also, gain to the monopolist
is less than loss of consumer's surplus. Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 11-14.
2I See RESTATEMENT ON RESTITUTION § 151 (1937).
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fendants since the entire class of antitrust victims is rarely involved in
the suit and those victims who do sue are often prevented from
recovering for all harm suffered.
The Areeda and Turner proposal for a discretionary add-on of
double or treble damages is beguiling, but ultimately unpersuasive
once these considerations are taken into account.2 23 The impact of the
innovation would likely be severe since the fruits of a successful suit
would be reduced by two-thirds while the costs and risks would
remain the same. Indeed, the costs-both to plaintiff and to the court
system-could increase substantially since a new issue of the "wittingness" of any violation by the defendant would also have to be proven
to obtain multiple recovery, and it would be a rare plaintiff who
would not seek to tailor his case to obtain a discretionary add-on.
It is, of course, true that all of these considerations favoring the
present treble damage remedy could be taken into account by the
judge in deciding whether to award "extra" damages. But that would
necessarily add a number of other issues to an already complex proceeding, e.g., the amount of unjust enrichment to the defendant and
the number of uncompensated victims. Indeed, if fully explored, these
issues might dwarf the underlying dispute. Moreover, the benefit
purchased by the added costs of discretionary trebling is at best marginal and at worst illusory. Truly unwitting violators would be treated
more fairly because they would not be penalized, but there is no

23 Perhaps this can be seen by taking the case offered by Areeda and Turner in which they
attempt to show the inappropriateness of treble damages. The "behavior-less monopoly," i.e., a
monopoly "free of conduct that the law reprehends as such," 2 P. AnREoA & D. TURNER, supra
note 33, at 311c n.9, would not be subject to either criminal sanctions or treble damage actions,
allowing only government equity suits. From an efficiency standpoint, however, the rejection of
criminal sanctions and treble damages is too facile: while this type of monopolist, by definition,
engaged in no wrongful conduct in achieving the monopoly, it also, by definition, continued its
monopoly too long. If it should be broken up by a government equity suit, then it can be
dissolved "voluntarily," and the existence of criminal sanctions or treble damages provide a
strong incentive to do just that.
It is true, of course, that there are difficulties with a private damage suit. Assuming
damages are measured by the extent of the monopoly overcharge, the private action must fix the
point when a legal monopoly became illegal by its persistent maintenance despite market forces.
But this is scarcely insurmountable: the law routinely fixes points on continua to affect legal
consequences even if there is some arbitrariness in the process. As for fairness, it is not clear why
treble damages are unfair when a monopolist continues to extract its overcharge by having
maintained its monopoly too long rather than engaging, voluntarily, in the dissolution Antitrust
Law believes the law should require.
It may be thought that it is asking too much to expect a going monopoly to dissolve itself
prior to a court order. That is, of course, precisely the reason to refuse to rule out criminal
sanctions or treble damages for such monopolies. They can provide a motivation that would
otherwise be lacking.
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guarantee that they could not in fact profit by their mistake in terms
of retaining most of the fruits of their violation.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF THE TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY

The Reagan Administration has proposed a number of modifications to the federal antitrust laws. 224 Although several of these proposals may have significant effects on antitrust policy,

22 5

the focus of

present concern is the attempt to limit treble damage recovery to "per
se" violations. 226 If this proposal were to become law, conduct held to

224

The President's Cabinet approved the package of proposed statutory changes on March 24,

1983. President's Proposal, supra note 3, at 713; see infra note 228. A somewhat narrower
proposal, barring treble damages against joint ventures which disclose certain facts to the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, has been sent to Congress by the
President as part of the recommended National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983, H.R.
3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
It is more than a little ironic that there are calls for a limitation on treble damages in
antitrust at a time when there seems to be a new interest in the treble damage approach in other
areas of federal law. For instance, treble damages are available for violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, § 1964 (c) (1976 & Supp. V
1981). See generally Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A
Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201
(1981); Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some Maturational Problems and Proposals for
Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285 (1983). Similarly, the House of Representatives has passed the
Insiders Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), which would,
inter alia, permit the Securities Exchange Commission to see up to three times the amount of
profit gained, or loss prevented, by insider trading. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1038, Part One
(Sept. 21, 1983).
225 These proposals would make certain changes in the treatment of intellectual property.
More specifically, they would require rule of reason analysis with respect to joint research and
development activities and with respect to patent, trademark, and copyright licensing. President's Proposal, supra note 3, at 681. They would also revise the patent misuse doctrine and
expand process patentee rights to block the importation of products built abroad with the
protected process. Id.
226The Supreme Court has utilized two distinct standards for evaluating the legality of an
alleged antitrust violation. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965): L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at §§ 63-72.
Under the first approach the Court will find per se invalid those business relations "which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
441 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Under the rule of reason approach the Court will inquire into the reasonableness of an
alleged restraint, Standard Oil Co, v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and, accordingly, will
analyze "the facts peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the
restraint and its effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption." Topco,
405 U.S. at 607; Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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be an antitrust violation under the "rule of reason" standard 27 would
subject the defendant only to actual damages plus interest. 228
The origins of this proposal are unclear.2 29 In terms of the two
strains of criticisms of treble damage already discussed in this article,
however, it seems reasonable to infer that the Administration's proposed modification of antitrust remedies derives, directly or indirectly, -from both the Areeda-Turner concern with fairness to defend,ants and from the perception of some commentators that treble
damages may deter conduct which is desirable insofar as the risk ot
such liability provides an incentive to stay well within the boundaries
230
of the law.
These two concerns would in fact be accommodated by adoption
of the Administration's proposal. First, the limitation of treble damages to per se offenses would reduce fairness concerns. No longer (or,
at least, less frequently) would defendants find themselves paying
threefold a plaintiff's damages for conduct which the defendant had
little reason to believe was illegal. Instead, the defendant would be
charged with treble damages only when the damages are attributable
to "agreements or practices . . . which [are] so plainly anticompetitive
that they [would be] deemed unreasonable .... .231 Further, insofar
as the rule of reason is utilized to analyze cases where there is doubt of

227

228

See supra note 226.
President'sProposal, supra note 3, at 713. The proposed statutory language would amend

§ 4 of the Clayton Act to read in important part as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover [threefold the]
actual damages by him sustained, simple interest on actual damages for the period
beginningon the date of service of such person's pleadingsetting forth a claim under
the antitrust laws and ending on the date of judgment, such interest to be adjusted
by the court if it finds that the award of all or part of such interest is unjust in the
circumstances, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee; provided,
that damages attributableto agreements or practices the nature or necessary effect of
which is so plainly anticompetitive that they are deemed unreasonableand therefore
illegal without elaboratestudy in each individual case as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business justificationfor their use shall be trebled.
Id. at 713 (emphasis in original). The proposal would also similarly amend § 4(a)(2) of the
Clayton Act pertaining to state parens patriae suits and amend § 4(a) of the Clayton Act to
provide for interest on the actual damages obtained in government suits. Id.
229 The proposal has a much narrower precursor in the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982)), which limits
certain exporters to single damage liability, 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1).
230 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 56, at 27; see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
211President'sProposal, supra note 3, at 713; see supra note 228.
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the competing advantages and disadvantages, the "single damage"
approach would reduce the overdeterrence possibility by making such
conduct less risky. In terms of the "evils" identified by Elzinga and
Breit, both "perverse incentives" and the "misinformation" effect
would be reduced as the size of the pot of gold shrinks, although
neither would be eliminated, and the problems of "reparations costs"
would remain.232
The Administration proposal may be criticized even if one accepts its goals: drawing a line between per se antitrust offenses, which
continue to generate treble damage liability, and rule of reason violations, which will subject the offender to lesser sanctions, may not be
appropriate. Conduct subject to "reasonableness" analysis is not necessarily less heinous than actions which are reviewed under a per se
standard. Rather, the rule of reason is frequently utilized to address
conduct with which the courts are unfamiliar. Such conduct may be
as pernicious as recognized per se violations. Indeed the conduct now
recognized as per se illegal-including price-fixing-was at one time
analyzed under a reasonableness standard. 23 3 On the other hand, at
least one commentator has argued that the Administration's proposal
limit treble damages: further, even conduct which is now categorized
as per se illegal should not necessarily trigger treble damage liabil234
ity.

2132Another considerably different justification has been offered for a limitation of the treble
damage rule. Donald I. Bal, , former head of the Antitrust Division, argues that the availability
of automatic treble damages "seems to have had a number of distorting effects in antitrust
jurisprudence." Baker, supra note 180, at 20. His point is that the draconian nature of the treble
damage remedy has led to rules which might not otherwise be appropriate. These include (1)the
narrow rules of "standing" to assert antitrust damage suits, primarily the IllinoisBrick limitation
of damage recovery to "direct purchasers"; (2) the judicial extension of antitrust immunities to
conduct which arguably is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny; and (3) the statutory creation of
immunities by Congress. Id. at 20. In sum, the Baker position is that some limitation on treble
damage recovery would in fact free antitrust law to be broader in its reach and perhaps broader
in the numbers of persons who will have some claim to damage recovery under the statutes.
Although there is undoubtedly some basis to Mr. Baker's position, it seems overdrawn. For
example, it is doubtful if antitrust "standing" doctrine is any more amorphous or restrictive than
analogous doctrines in other areas. Thus, constitutional "standing" is notoriously confused, see
generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNc, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68-83
(1978), and first year law students are traditionally bedeviled by Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). Secondly, the creation of judicial or legislative antitrust
immunities, however troublesome, can scarcely be attributed to the treble damages remedy
alone. Numerous other explanations ranging from purely political considerations to the difficulties of integrating the antitrust laws into areas with more pervasive federal regulations are
conceivable and no doubt better explain particular immunities.
13 See generally M. HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957).
234 E.g., Baker, supra note 180, at 20-21. Mr. Baker, while approving of some limitations oil
treble damages, is skeptical of the line drawn by the Administration proposal: the dividing line
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While one could argue about the wisdom of where precisely the
Administration proposes to draw a line between treble damage and
single damage liability offenses in terms of the policy goals the proposal apparently seeks to achieve, a more fundamental concern is
whether any limitation on treble damage recovery is appropriate.
Previous parts of this article have cast doubt on concerns over whether
fairness to defendants or inefficiency is a reason to limit (or abolish)
the treble damage action. 235 The Reagan Administration proposal
offers an opportunity to present the case for treble damages in a more
positive fashion.
Essentially, any justification for the treble damage action must
rest on two bases. At a minimum, it must be grounded on fairness, but
that concern must first concentrate on the victims of antitrust violations rather than those who perpetrate harms. It is true that any
particular prevailing plaintiff may theoretically be overcompensated,
but there is reason to doubt that this will frequently occur due to the
large gap between actual harm and provable harm. 236 The treble
damage recovery is a means of righting that balance by compensating
the plaintiff for damages not adequately accounted for in the damages
equation.
In any event, a second fairness justification, although abstract,
must be considered. While ideally the legal system would do perfect
justice in each individual case, it has long been recognized that less
precisely balanced justice is essential for the functioning of the judicial
process. Just as rules such as the statutes of frauds and statutes of
limitations are permitted to work injustices in individual situations in
the belief that they will lead generally to more just results over the
multitude of cases, so also may it be necessary in antitrust to decide
whether applicable remedies can be as finely tuned as some commentators would suggest. It is here that the question of fairness to the class
of antitrust victims comes into play. If,as this article has argued, the

between "'per se" offenses and rule of reason cases is too uncertain for him. Rather, Baker would
make single damages the general rule and treble damages available only for one class of cases: "a
covert agreement among competitors to fix prices or allocate customers, territories, or markets."
Id. at 21. For Baker, the critical point is to limit treble damages to the most reprehensible of
antitrust conduct. Id. Baker would also build in a disincentive for plaintiffs seeking treble
damages-he would make such persons liable to defendant for the costs of suit, including a
reasonable attorney fee, if they did not prevail. Id. This risk would not be faced by a plaintiff
who sought only actual damages. Id.
Courts have also struggled with the process of distinguishing per se from rule of reason
violations. See Baker, supra note 180, at 21 & n.23 and cases cited therein.
231 See supra notes 43-224 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
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systemic tendency of damage and standing rules is to undercompensate, treble damages may be one way to right the balance somewhat
by shifting back onto violators the true costs of their conduct. While
one can question the accuracy of the multiplier selected by Congress,
few of the arguments against treble damages even attempt to put
broader justice concerns into focus. The result is, in the name of
fairness to defendants, a systematic bias against antitrust victims.
In the process of compensating victims, treble damages also
achieve the second goal of creating a significant deterrent effect for
potential violators. That deterrent effect cannot be underestimated.
Historically, there has been a very limited number of meaningful civil
or criminal monetary penalties imposed on antitrust offenders. 237 Further, the rarity of actually putting antitrust violators in prison is well
recognized. 238 This is especially true in rule of reason cases, where the
government has traditionally hesitated even to seek criminal sanctions. 239 Although there are a few celebrated cases of equitable remedies, e.g., dissolution of monopolies, the relief obtained by the government in the typical antitrust suit is merely a consent decree. 240 As a
result, the treble damage remedy has been the major sanction actually
24
imposed throughout the history of the Sherman Act. '
It is, of course, true that the size of a deterrent varies with the
degree to which one wants to deter the conduct in question. And it is
equally true that antitrust does not view all anticompetitive conduct
as equally heinous. Some violations fall closer to core antitrust values
than others, and some offer virtues which, if not sufficient to redeem
the conduct in question, at least mitigate its rigors. That fact, coupled
with the fear of deterring beneficial conduct which would probably
be held legal but which is close enough to the line to be avoided by
risk-averse companies, might warrant some modification of the treble

237 Until the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § l(c) (1982), the
maximum criminal monetary penalty was $50,000. Even today, the penalty is only $1.000,000
for a corporation and $100,000 for other persons. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3. Obviously, the maximum
penalty may well be less than the harm caused by even relatively minor anticompetitive
activities. And it has been stated that the fines actually imposed, which frequently do not reach
the statutory maximum, have been "little more than license fees when compared with the
benefits realizable from price-fixing." Baker & Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86
YALE L.J. 619 (1977); see also. Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630
(1977).
23 See, e.g., Baker & Reeves, supra note 237, at 623 & n.16.
139 Id. at 623-24.
240 See Sullivan, supra note 122, at 826 n.1l.

Berger & Bernstein, supra note 30, at 848-49; DuVal (I), supra note 24, at 1025.
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damage action, whether along the lines proposed by Areeda and
Turner, or by the Reagan Administration.
The problem with any modification of the treble damage action
is twofold. First, legal rules as applied often vary significantly from
legal rules as announced. The very unwillingness of the judiciary to
utilize the more severe sanctions now available for antitrust violations
hardly offers a basis for believing that any modification of the mandatory treble damage rule would be used sparingly. Instead, there is
every reason to believe that discretion would be used to broadly
exempt defendants from treble damages. 242 Such a result is to be
anticipated directly from the Areeda-Turner approach, which would
grant discretion (unconfined by any as-yet-articulated principles).
The tendency, however, would also be present in the Administration's
proposal. The per se categories are scarcely so unyielding that judges
could not often shift cases from per se illegal to rule of reason illegal if
it would avoid the "punitive" impact of treble damages.
The second problem with any modification is more fundamental
and is not easily avoidable by manipulation of the Administration's
proposal. It is simply the inevitable deterrent effect on innovative
suits. It is common ground to every attack on treble damages that the
more "innocent" the conduct, the less appropriate are treble damages.
But it is obvious that it is precisely with respect to conduct not
presently recognized as illegal that greater incentives are needed if
suits are to be brought.
This is not to argue that the state of antitrust today requires
massive readjustments to be worked by private actions. Nor is it to
encourage great numbers of new cases. The point is simply that the
obstacles to private suits are formidable, despite the treble damage
reward. Even under the prevalent favorable remedial scheme, antitrust practitioners are few in number in view of the economic importance of the discipline and prospective clients are frequently unwilling
or unable to finance the complex litigation that typifies the antitrust
suit, even the "small one." The possibilities of attorneys' fees and
treble damages make practicable actions which would otherwise not

242 Two cases which illustrate the pliancy of per se categories are Broadcast Music, Inc. v.

Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) and National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The former case involved apparently per se conduct which
was ultimately recognized as being subject to the rule of reason. The latter case is apparently a
rule of reason decision, but the analysis is so straightforward that the determination of illegality
was more readily reached than in some per se decisions.
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be brought. If we are to take antitrust law seriously, it may be
necessary to provide such incentives for enforcement.
Ironically enough, the very package of which the treble damage
limitation is a part constitutes Reagan Administration proposals designed to free American competitive innovations. 24 3 But the common
ground of all proposals to limit treble damages is to deter antitrust
innovations by virtue of removing the incentive to bring suits under
new theories or even under new applications of old theories. The
thrust is conservative in the worst sense of the word: it must be rooted
in a belief that antitrust law and analysis has reached a stage of such
refined development that changes are to be discouraged because they
will, individually or on balance, make things worse, not better. Defending the status quo is one thing; freezing it is another. Especially in
a time when substantive doctrines are being cut back by the federal
enforcement agencies and by the courts, it seems ill-advised to remove, under some now unrecognized legal, economic, or social theory, the incentives for private plaintiffs to establish in court the illegality under the Sherman Act of conduct that, for whatever reason,
our society and legal system now tolerate.

243 The Reagan Administration proposal has been described as "part of an international trade
bill designed to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms in international markets." President's
Proposal,supra note 3, at 713.

